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This technical report documents the author's incomplete
research into the subject matter. The author was originally
supposed to conduct research on this subject from October 1, 1992
- September 30, 1994 and indeed did commence the research effort
as scheduled — completing work during the end of 1992 and early
1993 with translations available in the U.S. through mid-1992.
The sponsor decided to redirect the researcher's efforts before
the researcher commenced working with translations dating from
after mid-1992. This report, therefore, documents the initial
work that the researcher did prior to having his research efforts
redirected and is not complete. The researcher compiled a full
set of translations on the subject matter and left them at the
National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate
School for anyone else desiring to complete this research effort.
n
Military Doctrine and Strategy in the Former Soviet Union:




Is the old Soviet threat to the United States and the danger
of a European- centered, global, superpower war so remote today
that it can be ignored? Can the West safely shift its strategic
security planning focus to contingency operations and nonmilitary
threats? Do events in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, or the
Checheniya Republic cause alarm in the West by raising the spect-
er of a fragmented Soviet empire? Might a fragmented USSR con-
sist of multiple and unpredictable nuclear actors? Could we see,
instead, a central core that lashes out from its deathbed? Once
the breakup of the old Soviet empire is complete, will a new
strong Russian central government take its place? Would such a
strong government be just as great a threat to the West as the
past one? Will the new Russian military change its fundamental
views on strategic nuclear deterrence and deployed nuclear sys-
tems?
The profound and evolving changes in the threat have direct
bearings on the strategies and forces that the United States and
NATO need to develop. The danger of war with the former USSR
still exists, but the type of armed conflict that we have all
considered the most likely commands not nearly so much interest
today as it did even a few years ago.
This report will first consider the debate over military
doctrine and strategy in the final days of the Soviet Union and
the first six months of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) and Russian Federation. Since the direction that the CIS
and former Soviet republics will take should be cast in terms of
their immediate past, a brief review of recent Soviet history is
warranted. The report will then shift to an analysis of the
organizational development of the armed forces themselves.
Having considered these overall questions, the report will then
outline their implications on the Navy. The source material for
this report is the open- source literature and statements of
authorized spokesmen in the former Soviet Union.
The development of new maritime aspects of Soviet and Rus-
sian military doctrine and strategy must be interpreted in the
context of the debate over doctrine and military reform that have
been ongoing since 1985. To fully understand the evolving Rus-
1. The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not
necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Navy.
sian navy, the reader must first review those debates and only-
then consider their maritime perspective.
The Soviet navy was the last service to be considered in the
doctrine and reform debates. It has been a major failing of
certain members of the Western analytic community to search for
the future of the Soviet navy primarily through an analysis of
the Soviet naval literature. My own research over the years has
caused me to conclude that a more proper way to view the navy is
to first review what the political leadership has to say and then
to look at the statements of the marshals and generals who are
authorized spokesmen for the ministry of defense and the general
staff. Only by setting the navy literature into the context of
the views of seniors can one properly appreciate the naval liter-
ature as being advocacy or announcement of agreed-upon views.
WARSAW PACT AND SOVIET DEFENSIVE MILITARY DOCTRINE
The Warsaw Pact issued a new defensive military doctrine in
1987 that was supposed to give guidance for both the sociopoliti-
cal and military- technical aspects of Soviet military doctrine.
Later that same year, then-Soviet Minister of Defense, Army
General Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov appeared to accept that change
when he wrote in his book In Defense of Socialism and Peace that
"Soviet military doctrine looks upon defense in the quality of
basic type of military actions in the repulse of aggression"
(emphasis added). Following this passage, however, Yazov stated
that:
"However, it is impossible to destroy an
aggressor by defense alone. Therefore, after
the repulse of the attack, troops and naval
forces must be able to mount a decisive
offensive. The transition to this takes the
form of a counterof fensive, which it will be
necessary to conduct in the difficult and
tense situation of confrontation with a well-
armed enemy.
"
According to Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, then- deputy
director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, in his 1989 testimo-
ny before the U.S. Congress (emphasis added):
"the Soviet General Staff representatives
issued a statement in June, 1987, to the
effect that henceforth the actions of the
Soviet Armed Forces in the event of counter-
ing aggression would primarily consist of
defensive operations and combat actions. I
would say that this was the biggest change in
our strategic thinking since the late 1920s."
Acceptance of the defense as the main form of action for the
Soviet Armed Forces was reiterated repeatedly in 1990 by Army
General Mikhail Alekseyevich Mpiseyev, then-Chief of the General
Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and Marshal Yazov. Defense, as
the "main form of combat activity," however, did not mean to
these military leaders "a passive defense, but rather an active,
decisive one. Defeat of the aggressor will be accomplished using
the entire arsenal of arms and equipment in the field, by in-
flicting powerful counterstrikes and counterattacks."
Some articles indicated that although military doctrine
would be defensive, and victory may be ruled out by the political
leadership at the strategic-level of warfare, victory may be a
justifiable goal at the operational or tactical-levels. Army
General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, then-Chief of Staff of the
Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, stated in 1989 that (emphasis
added)
:
"the present-day Soviet military doctrine
envisages defence as the principal type of
combat operations in repulsing aggression.
The purpose is to check the enemy offensive,
enfeeble the enemy forces, prevent loss of a
considerable part of territory, and provide
conditions for a complete defeat of the enemy
troops. This is impossible to achieve by
defensive tactics only. That is why, having
repelled the enemy attack, the Soviet troops
must be ready to launch a decisive counterof-
fensive.
"
A great debate took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s
within the Soviet Union over what exactly was meant by a defen-
sive military doctrine and a subordinate defensive military
strategy. Participating in this debate were military theoreti-
cians, historians, strategists, civilian academics, and the
leaders of the armed forces themselves. Some of the participants
indicated that the previously published defensive military doc-
trine of the Warsaw Pact had not seriously resulted in changes in
the military-technical side of doctrine or in operational plans
for or the organizational development of the forces themselves. 10
Of course, to properly analyze future directions for the
armed forces, one must also include hardware, deployment, and
exercise evidence. For the most part, that has not been done in
this report. The author is convinced based upon his previous
research, however, that there is a benefit from doing literature
analysis in the absence of these other significant forms of
evidence. When it comes to the views of the Soviet, and then the
Russian, military on their new military doctrine and strategy,
due to a host of economic, political, and other factors, it will
be some time before we see any significant shifts in hardware,
deployments, and exercises that we can attribute to the changes
in doctrine and strategy.
During the open period of discussion of military doctrine
and strategy, some senior officers openly discussed committing
the USSR "to not begin military operations (voyennyye deystviya)
at the strategic-level of warfare against any state" except in
response to an attack. 11 Paralleling this debate over doctrine
and strategy was a debate over the organizational development of
the armed forces, largely conducted by a debate over exactly what
was meant by the term "sufficiency." 12
Due to the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance,
a draft defensive Soviet military doctrine 13 and separate draft
military reform plan, consistent with the new doctrine, 14 were
openly published in late 1990. Both were widely discussed in the
Soviet and Western literature. Under this draft doctrine, the
USSR renounced war and the use or threat of military force to
settle any political, economic and ideological differences.
The 1990 draft military doctrine went so far as to state
that the USSR: (1) did not regard any people as its enemy, (2)
had no territorial claims, and, (3) did not strive for military
superiority. The draft stated that the USSR wanted to reduce
armed forces to: "a minimum agreed-upon level so that in provid-
ing for its defense, no side would have the means and capabili-
ties for a surprise attack on the other side and for conducting
large-scale offensive operations." The draft doctrine appeared
to accept that defense of the USSR would consist of defensive
military operations originating from within its own territory.
It did not say that the USSR armed forces have any defensive
mission external to the homeland. The draft doctrine, however,
also reserved the right of the USSR to make maximum use of any
military capabilities for stopping aggression aimed against it or
any state allied with it.
To understand the subsequent debates that occurred over the
military doctrine of the Soviet Union (in its last days) , the
newly formed CIS, and later in Russia, it is first necessary to
understand that there was a great debate ongoing. In this de-
bate, the major bureaucratic actors - the military services, the
Soviet General Staff, and the Soviet Ministry of Defense - had
previously taken positions which would affect their positions in
the subsequent debate. The positions of these actors largely
predicted how they would interpret the lessons of the Persian
Gulf war and how they would react to the breakup of the Soviet
empire. It is to these subjects that this report will now turn.
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IMPACT OF OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
The Soviet view of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM
affected what happened to the 1990 draft Soviet military doctrine
and draft military reform—neither of which had been fully imple-
mented by the time of the commencement of offensive military
operations in the Persian Gulf. This section will first review
Soviet commentary during the various stages of coalition military
and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf. It will then consid-
er the "quick-look" early lessons learned. Finally, this section
will consider subsequent in-depth analyses by the Soviets and
Russians.
Commentary on Operation DESERT SHIELD
Comments in the Soviet literature about the coalition re-
sponse to defend Saudi Arabia generally involved political and
foreign policy issues. As a Marxist-Leninist state, the Soviets
searched for and found an economic basis for American interven-
tion despite the other reasons that appeared more important to
us. There was also obvious concern for Soviet military advisors
in the region and discussion on the viability of the economic
blockade.
Enforcement of the blockade at sea was a topic of concern
specifically by naval officers. Soviet Navy flag officers de-
ployed in the Indian Ocean stressed that their mission included
ensuring that Soviet shipping was protected, especially in the
areas of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The interdiction of
a Soviet merchant ship in the Red Sea in early January 1991 by
coalition (U.S. and Spanish) naval forces was a topic of discus-
sion by the Soviet Foreign Ministry and in the civilian litera-
ture. The interdiction apparently was not contested by the
ship's captain or Soviet warships deployed in the area.
As in the West, there were discussion of whether the appro-
priate intelligence services had received indications of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait before it actually took place. The
Soviet General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) argued
that they had two weeks warning of the invasion but that the
Defense Ministry did not pass the information on to the nation's
leaders. The Committee on State Security (KGB) also said that
they had received advance notification.
The late Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich
Akhromeyev, then-military advisor to the USSR president and
former Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, was free
with his opinions on the deterrent phase of coalition operations
as well as the coming military combat operations. Akhromeyev
expressed concern in early October 1990, that a large grouping of
American armed forces was now deployed close to the southern
border of the USSR. He implied that this constituted a threat
to the Soviet Union. This theme would reappear later from offi-
cial spokesmen inside the Soviet military and government.
A major analysis of Operation DESERT SHIELD was published in
the January 1991 issue of the Soviet journal Foreign Military
Review just as the air campaign portion of Operation DESERT STORM
broke out. In this analysis, the Soviet author correctly enu-
merated the steps that had been taken by the American armed
forces to respond in the Persian Gulf. The accounting is rather
complete and included naval, marine corps, and maritime sealift
forces
.
Commentary on Planning for Operation DESERT STORM
Soviet press reports included predictions of how Persian
Gulf combat operations might evolve. Some of these proved highly
accurate descriptions of the eventual overall conduct of the air
and air/ground portions of Operation DESERT STORM. None of the
initial reports by Soviet civilian authors paid any significant
attention to the role of maritime forces.
On the other hand, a Soviet general officer wrote an article
in early January 1990 in the Ministry of Defense newspaper Red
Star that claimed the coalition hoped to capitalize on its over-
whelming superiority in "aviation, naval forces, highly accurate
weapons, and electronic warfare." 9 This general officer went on
to say that the American command would "give priority at the
first stages of an armed conflict to the operations of aviation
and the Navy .
"
Priority was defined in this Red Star article as: taking out
Iraqi air defenses and command and control, establishing "domina-
tion" in the air and simultaneously destroying Iraqi aircraft,
operational- tactical missile launchers, armored forces assault
groups, and the military industrial complex. The means of accom-
plishing these tasks were predicted as aviation and TOMAHAWK sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) . According to the general, only
following the accomplishment of these tasks, would the Americans
employ Army and Marine Corps ground forces offensively to liber-
ate Kuwait.
The article on Operation DESERT SHIELD contained in the
January 1991 Soviet Foreign Military Review also had a fairly
accurate prediction of the scenario of the impending offensive
combat-phase. This version also assumed that a ground forces
offensive would be required to achieve the strategic objectives
of the campaign.
Marshal Akhromeyev predicted in early January that Iraq
would withdraw in the face of overwhelming coalition forces de-
ployed to the region. 11 He later stated that if offensive combat
operations were to begin, it would be extremely dangerous for the
Soviet Union because it would be difficult to contain the coali-
tion's contingency response.
This issue of the war spreading occupied the attention of
the few naval officers that discussed the impending conflict.
One Soviet Navy flag officer deployed in the Indian Ocean stated
at the end of December 1990 that the purpose of his task force
was: "to prevent aggressive actions against the USSR from the
area of the Indian Ocean. He also said that in case of a
"stronger war danger" in the Gulf, the task force might be rein-
forced by ships from the Soviet Mediterranean squadron and Pacif-
ic Fleet. This possibility had been previously refuted by the
deputy commander of the Indian Ocean Squadron
The use of the Soviet Navy as a defensive force against
forward deployed American aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs)
was the subject of a debate in the West in the late 1960s and
1970s. Two leading Western analysts of the Soviet Navy, Robert
Herrick and Michael MccGwire, argued that the primary reason
behind forward deployments of Soviet Navy anti-carrier forces was
the deployment of American nuclear-capable CVBGs, primarily in
the Mediterranean, within striking range of the USSR.
A major study of Soviet naval diplomacy published in 1979
concluded that the lack of overwhelming response to previous
American CVBG deployments, primarily in the Mediterranean, indi-
cated that the Soviets were not serious about a defensive strike
against these CVBGs. This study assumed that Soviet naval opera-
tional art and tactics would have required a much higher combat
capability against the American CVBGs in order to predict mission
accomplishment with a sizable degree of probability. Hence this
study concluded that the real motivation behind the forward
deployments of Soviet warships was politically-motivated military
presence and not defensively-motivated military counteraction.
The situation in Operation DESERT SHIELD that resulted in
the deployment of six American CVBGs in waters close to the
southern border of the USSR was clearly different that previous
deployments in the Mediterranean in support of Israel. On the
one hand, during the 1990-1991 crisis, the U.S. had also deployed
major ground and air forces within striking distance the southern
borders of the USSR. These forces were far in excess of the naval
forces deployed by the U.S. in the Mediterranean in the 1960s and
1970s. On the other hand, all of this massive DESERT SHIELD
force was tied to a United Nations (U.N. ) -mandated mission that
had the support of the USSR. American actions and her signifi-
cant military and naval forces in Southwest Asia were both re-
stricted by this U.N. mandate and the support of the American
public only for a limited military campaign against Saddam Hus-
sein and not the USSR.
If the motivation of previous Soviet naval anti-carrier
deployments was as a defensive measure, then the lack of Soviet
military response to the massive American military, air, and
naval presence in Southwest Asia in 1990-1991 might indicate that
they had come to view national security as not necessarily re-
quiring an automatic military response. The U.S., or other
potential adversaries, might take military actions near to the
borders of the USSR without a knee-jerk reaction by the marshals.
If the previous Soviet naval anti-carrier deployments were
primarily acts of naval diplomacy, then the lack of Soviet mari-
time response to the massive American naval presence in Southwest
Asia might indicate that they were turning inward and truly
abandoning overseas fraternal international missions. In the
past, support of such political goals often led to confrontations
at sea with the U.S. On the other hand, economic conditions
might also be an explanation for the lack of a politically-
motivated military response in 1990-1991.
One of the more interesting topics for discussion in Soviet
military science has been whether war takes on a life of its own
once combat commences or if it remains subordinate to political
directions. In an article published in Red Star just before the
outbreak of the air campaign portion of Operation DESERT STORM,
the Soviet military author reminded his reader that "a war, once
started, develops according to its own laws and its own logic." 16
The author only made this point in the context of the spreading
of Persian Gulf combat operations to unintended areas rather than
in the larger context often argued in the past by the
marshals—the military should be free of political constraints
when "unleashed" to perform their strategic missions after the
failure of deterrence.
Commentary During the Air Campaign
The initial commentary on the outbreak of hostilities, the
air campaign, by former-Soviet President Mikhail Sergeyevich
Gorbachev made specific reference to the need to "localize the
.17
conflict and prevent its dangerous escalation." Although this
theme appeared in subsequent commentary by other Soviet govern-
ment officials, military officers, and academics, no suggestion
was made that the USSR should increase its defensive combat
capability as a reaction. 18 On the contrary, the two Soviet Navy
warships that were in the Persian Gulf were immediately removed
from the region.
The Soviets fully recognized that the air campaign included
participation by U.S. naval aviation and TOMAHAWK SLCMs. One
interview with an advisor at the Administration for Arms Limita-
tion and Disarmament of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
included the comment that "cruise missiles are capable of ful-
filling strategic missions." 20 This comment should be interpret-
ed in the context of the on-going Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
(START) in which the Soviets were attempting to include SLCMS in
a treaty to reduce "strategic" nuclear forces.
On the other hand, commentary by a Soviet military officer
indicated that U.S. TOMAHAWK SLCMs fired from missile-armed
submarines destroyed "strategically important" targets. 21 Per-
10
haps even more interesting was his recognition that the trajec-
tory for these missiles included the aerospace of nations. Until
these attacks, Iraq could predict that the direction of SLCM
attacks would come from the relatively narrow waters of the
Persian Gulf. This issue must be seen in the context of the
larger question of the direction of likely SLCM attack on the
USSR in the context of a superpower war. Soviet literature has
depicted such attacks routinely violating the airspace of neutral
nations along her borders.
While the air campaign was on-going, there was relatively
little discussion of naval surface forces. One newspaper account
acknowledged that the Iraqi navy had been incapable of putting up
serious resistance due to total coalition superiority in the air
and at sea. This article also stated that the general mood of
the Iraqi fleet was one of despair. Small warships were ordered
to attempt to slip into Iranian territorial waters in order to
preserve them. This tactic was used to preserve units of the
Iraqi Air Force but with more success.
The bulk of the Soviet military commentary on the war during
the air campaign was whether a ground campaign would be necessary
or if the air war would be sufficient. Marshal Akhromeyev was
one of the first to enter the fray with a definite prediction
that he did not think that "an [Iraqi] army that has nine years
of war experience can be paralyzed simply by air attacks."
There were a number of articles and media events in which
spokesmen argued vehemently that, despite what the world was
watching on their television screens, the air war would not lead
to the accomplishment of the strategic objectives of the coali-
tion. One of these went so far as to say that [emphasis
added] : 26
"there has never been an occasion yet when
either air forces or missiles have determined
the outcome of military actions. A navy will
not determine it either. The main thing in
such operations are the land troops."
Towards the start of the air/ground offensive, the Soviet
military turned modest attention to the role that U.S. amphibious
forces would play. General-Lieutenant I. Skuratov, chief of the
Soviet Navy Shore Forces, wrote a rather in-depth, but short,
article on the subject in Red Star on February 12, 1991. 27
Although one must see this article in the context of a chief of a
combat arm of the Navy attempting to point out the importance of
his own type of force, the Skuratov article did contain some
important themes.
The historical surrogates used to discuss amphibious land-
ings were the U.S. Marine Corps landing at Inchon, Korea in 1950;
the British landing at Port Sa'id and Port Fu'ad, Egypt in 1956;
11
and the British landing on East Falklands Island in 1982. Skura-
tov then labeled each of these landings as operational-strategic,
operational, and operational-tactical due to the size of the
landing force. In the article, however, Skuratov stressed the
Inchon landing, clearly indicating that his assessment that the
impending use of U.S. Marine Corps troops in an amphibious opera-
tion in the Persian Gulf would be at the operational-strategic
level. Skuratov pointed out, correctly, that the Inchon landing
"exerted a decisive influence on the outcome of the Korean War as
a whole," a very strong theme indicating the importance of both
the landing operation and antilanding defenses. 28
Just prior to the commencement of the air/ground campaign,
there were a number of articles that complemented earlier predic-
tions on how the entire operation would unfold. 29 These articles
all foretold an amphibious invasion from the Persian Gulf. Given
the amount of coalition strategic, operational, and tactical
disinformation regarding the planned employment of its ground and
amphibious forces, it is hardly fair to fault the Soviets for
being taken in.
Commentary During and "Quick-Looks" After the Air/Ground Campaign
The air/ground portion of Operation DESERT STORM barely
lasted long enough for the Soviets to react and publish commenta-
ry. Then-Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Dmitriy Timofeyevich
Yazov gave a radio interview on February 26 in which he said that
"as soon as ground operations began they made Saddam's [Hussein]
defeat inevitable." This statement seemingly makes it appear
that Yazov was sympathetic in the debate whether a ground offen-
sive was required to the side that felt that it was still re-
quired for total victory.
One day after the completion of the air/ground portion of
Operations DESERT STORM, Marshal Yazov took the stand at the
Soviet Supreme Soviet for his confirmation hearings as Minister
of Defense. During the brief hearings, Yazov had to specifically
address the value of air defense troops in light of the recent
events in the Persian Gulf. Yazov acknowledged the role of the
air offensive operation, including the role played by aircraft
carriers, and stated that this would require "a review of atti-




The Soviet Navy was one of the first to publish a more in-
depth account of the war through its initial stages. 32 Until
this article, most commentary had referred to combat operations
as an air/ground campaign, probably in deference to the U.S.
Army's AIRLAND battle doctrine. In the February 1991 issue of
the Soviet Navy's journal Naval Digest, Captain 1st Rank K. Kzheb
referred to Operation DESERT STORM as an "air-land-sea" (emphasis
added) campaign, a term that the U.S. Navy was just beginning to
use to underscore the importance of maritime forces in joint
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warfare. Captain Kzheb did a thorough job of adding in the miss-
ing maritime elements to the picture that had been painted by
primarily ground and air forces officers who had dominated the
literature to date. His article was signed to press before the
start of the air/ground campaign, hence its value is somewhat
limited.
Kzheb did provide initial indications of themes that would
come to dominate the post -campaign analyses: (1) the failure of
the coalition to achieve certain important strategic objectives
with an air operation alone, (2) the importance of the initial
stage of the campaign, and (3) the value of smart airborne and
missile munitions and electronic warfare. Captain Kzheb added
one that generally would not be found except in naval journals:
(4) the coalition did not have to deploy a majority of their
naval forces in order to conduct their operational -strategic
level campaign.
The post -campaign discussion of the value of the air cam-
paign was even more heated that the debate that occurred over
this issue before the start of the air/ground campaign. Extreme
positions were taken by junior air force officers, including:
"Soviet military doctrine and the entire model of military build-
ing were obsolete," and "huge amounts of armored vehicles, tanks
and artillery pieces were absolutely useless." More senior air
force officers, such as General -Lieutenant of Aviation A.E.
Malyukov, chief of the Air Force Main Staff, were less threaten-
ing to the ground forces but still voiced their optimism in the
omnipotence of airpower: "there was no 'Air-Land Battle.'
Why? ...this is the first time we have witnessed a war where the
aviation took care almost entirely of all the main tasks."
More subdued versions of the same position were taken by a Soviet
civilian academic who specializes in military affairs. 5
During March 1991, the first substantive analysis of the
entire campaign appears in the Soviet press. Marshal Akhromeyev
provided an interview to the Moscow news magazine New Times.
Akhromeyev attributed Iraq's defeat, in part, due to the lack of
naval forces integrated into a national air defense system.
The Navy published a "quick- look" in their March 1991 issue
of Naval Digest but failed to pick up on Akhromeyev' s theme on
the value of naval forces. This article did, however, provide
a quantitative assessment of the degree of destruction of command
and control, missile capability, facilities for weapons of mass
destruction, energy producing facilities, etc. The similarity of
the categories of targets to numerous open- source discussions of
strategic nuclear targets lead one to speculate that analyses
must be on-going to compare the results of a conventional strate-
gic bombing offensive to planned nuclear strikes.
Another Navy initial analysis appeared in the April 23, 1991
issue of Red Star. ° Rear Admiral A. A. Pauk, chief of a Main
Navy Staff directorate, and Captain 1st Rank V. Karandeyev
stressed: (1) thorough integration of naval aviation and TOMAHAWK
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SLCMs in the air offensive, (2) participation of naval forces in
the AIRLAND battle (3) the multi-threat axis posed Iraq by the
presence of coalition maritime forces, and (4) the time consuming
[and unchallenged] buildup of maritime forces in Southwest Asia.
They documented the participation of maritime forces in joint
operations and the value of the high technology weapons. Pauk and
Karandeyev concluded that the war "convincingly confirmed the
role of naval forces in modern warfare."
In April 1991, Naval Digest published an exhaustive analysis
of the strategic deployment of U.S. military forces during the
Gulf war. 9 The article reminds one of the type of Western
articles frequently written about the Soviet merchant marines as
a military asset. The Soviet article focused more on the
strengths of the U.S. strategic sealift program rather than its
weaknesses that adorned the pages of American maritime litera-
ture. In both cases, Soviet and American authors use the events
of the war to highlight points that they would like to make about
the need to improve sealift programs associated with the merchant
marine.
Non-naval originated initial lessons learned from the Per-
sian Gulf wars tended to reduce the importance of fleet units
other than naval aviation and SLCMs. ° As time went on, ques-
tions were raised about the real accuracy of American high-
technology weapons. 1
Commentary by the Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey
Kozyrev in an April 1991 New Times article recognized the vital
importance of host nation support to the outcome of the campaign.
Kozyrev suggested that without it, the DESERT STORM would have
been "seriously hindered." Kozyrev did not raise the presence
of American seapower as an alternative mechanism to stage an
operational-strategic combat operations and one must assume that
he was aware of their presence.
Indications of an debate over the "quick-look" lessons of
the Persian Gulf war were given by former-President Gorbachev in
an April 11, 1991 interview broadcast on Japanese television.
Responding to a rather general question about post-war interna-
tional relations, Gorbachev stated that it was not true that the
global military balance had been overturned by Operation DESERT
STORM. This would have aligned himself with those who said that
the USSR did not need to rearm in order to counter the obvious
advantages displayed by the coalition.
Andrey Kozyrev told a New Times audience in April 1991 that
American weaponry demonstrated in the Persian Gulf war "does not
represent any threat to the USSR." The Russian Federation
Foreign Minister clearly stated that rather than rebuilding their
arsenal to match the West, a minimal nuclear deterrent posture
was all that was needed to make sure "that no one will make any
encroachments on the Soviet borders."
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Political commentary in mid-March 1991 by President Gor-
bachev following the war included the suggestion that: "in the
event of the emergence of a threat to shipping in the Persian
Gulf region naval forces should be set up under the UN flag."
The United Nations Military Committee was recommended as having
role in future crisis situations.
Substantive and Subsequent Post-Campaign Analyses
Most of the "quick-look" lessons learned either lacked depth
or analyzed the contributions of one service or combat arm. More
comprehensive analyses were to come. The first major analysis of
the war that took a more comprehensive and in-depth look at the
Persian Gulf war was the report of a roundtable discussion of
general and flag officers published in the May 1991 issue of the
journal of the USSR General Staff Academy, Military Thought. 46
Participants in the roundtable included a number of Soviet au-
thors of previous "quick-looks;" General-Lieutenant S. Bogdanov,
chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Operational-Strate-
gic Research Center; General-Lieutenant of Aviation A.E. Malyu-
kov, chief of the Air Force Main ftaff; and Rear Admiral A. A.
Pauk, chief of a Main Navy Staff directorate.
General Malyukov was not quite so outspoken this time in his
advocacy of airpower but he could not help but compare the suc-
cess of coalition air efforts with the theories of Italian Gener-
al Giulio Douhet. Another participant, General-Colonel of Avia-
tion I.M. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff,
was perhaps even more of an advocate for airpower, including
naval air, when he claimed that coalition aviation groupings were
capable of performing "strategic missions." Maltsev pointed out
the need for strong air defense forces to oppose the massive
strikes of aircraft that will come at the beginning of any future
war. Both airpower advocates, however, deferred to the role of
the ground forces by adherence to the General Staff party line
that one branch of the armed forces is incapable of deciding the
course and outcome of war.
The navy's contributions were presented by Admiral Pauk. In
this forum, he stressed: (1) the operation of ad hoc coalition
forces under a unified plan in nontraditional areas, (2) the
contribution of naval forces to the air operation, (3) high
technology weapons and surveillance systems, (4) the role that
strategic sealift played in facilitating Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM, (5) the naval blockade, and (6) the threat to
land up to two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) . Pauk con-
cluded that "naval forces are acquiring a leading role in local
conflicts as the most versatile and mobile branch of the armed
forces capable of accomplishing a wide range of missions at sea,
on land and in the air." It is one thing to point out that a
given combat arm is increasing in importance, and quite another
to state that it is more important than another service. Pauk
did not say that navies were more important than anyone else.
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The General Staff position was more balanced and did not
include significant attention to the contribution of naval
forces. General Bogdanov pointed out that Western cruise mis-
siles did not cause sufficient damage. General -Major A. Ya.
Gulko, deputy chief of a General Staff main directorate, conclud-
ed the roundtable with the assessment that:
"in itself, the offensive air operation and
subsequent systemic operations by multina-
tional forces' aircraft were unable to lead
to achievement of the political and military-
strategic goals set in this reason. Their
main purpose was to undermine Iraq's mili-
tary-economic potential and inflict damage on
it which would ensure successful development
of ground engagements with minimum losses for
coalition armed forces."
One of the next most important public statements on the war
was by Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev, then- Chief of
the General Staff, at a Ministry of Defense scientific conference
on June 6, 1991. Moiseyev delivered the main report at this
conference which concerned itself with the lessons learned from
the Persian Gulf war. He told the press, after delivering his
report, that the lessons of the war should not be used as "'a
pretext' for making immediate changes in the military reform in
the Soviet Armed Forces." He then added:
"the changed balance of military and politi-
cal forces in the world, the changes that
have happened and continue to take place in
the country's domestic and foreign policy and
new approaches towards the defense efficiency
and security of our state" [require a need to
alter military doctrine, strategy, operation-
al art, and tactics]
Moiseyev 's remarks are important because they acknowledge
that the 1990 draft Soviet military doctrine and reform plans
would have to be revised. They are also important because they
acknowledge that there had been an altering of the military
balance, specifically repudiated by former Soviet President
Gorbachev in his April 11, 1991 interview broadcast on Japanese
television. Such a substantive difference of opinion would
indicate either a rift between the Chief of the General Staff and
the Soviet president or that Gorbachev had altered his views.
An excellent substantive overview was published in Foreign
Military Review in their July 1991 issue. On the whole, this
article pays little attention to naval forces except in the
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context of their contribution to the air campaign. The Soviet
military authors appeared to suggest that the air power and high
technology weapons were decisive. When writing about the mili-
tary equipment of air forces, they noted that "air forces of the
anti-Iraq coalition played a decisive role in destroying Iraq's
military-economic potential, inflicting unacceptable damage on
the Iraqi Army, and creating conditions for its rapid defeat
during the course of the air-land operation." This generally
parallels the position of the General Staff at the roundtable
published in the May edition of Military Thought. On the other
hand, when discussing the military equipment employed by navies,
they stated (emphasis added)
:
"On the whole, the new weapons employed by
the United States and its allies in the
Persian Gulf zone made it possible to inflict
serious damage on the armed forces and mili-
tary-industrial potential of Iraq and for all
practical purposes decided the outcome of the
war . "
The Soviet authors of this article may have been speaking from
the perspective of the West, but the U.S. had yet to issue a
definitive statement making such a grandiose claim.
A substantive analysis of the war was published by a senior
researcher at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute in the August issue
of their journal USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology. 9 Sergey
Mikhaylovich Rogov provided an interesting overview of the war,
including its military- strategic implications. In the pre-
Gorbachev era, such articles were rare, unimportant, and general-
ly ignored. Articles today on military issues by Soviet and
Russian academics like Sergey Rogov are important and cannot be
ignored. Indeed, General -Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, the
new Russian Defense Minister, told a conference at the General
Staff Academy in May 1992, that such outsiders will be involved
in the process of setting up the Russian armed forces. 50
In his article, Rogov sided with those who were arguing that
the war demonstrated the value to modern high technology weapons.
Rogov went so far as to state that airpower was decisive and that
"combat operations developed almost exactly in line with the
classic plan of General Douhet . " He claimed that the ground
offensive was not a factor in deciding the outcome of the war.
His analysis allowed Rogov to conclude that "given the
present technological level, attack systems are superior to
defense systems" [emphasis in the original] . He then tied this
to the current Soviet debate over a defensive doctrine and con-
cluded that the "war in the Persian Gulf proved that the inabili-
ty of the defensive side to organize a counterstrike dooms it to
defeat." Rogov did not, however, state that this counterstrike
needed to be with ground forces. Indeed, one might conclude that
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his article implies that they would be of high technology air
forces!
In addition to these initial substantive analyses, the
individual services and combat arms continued to produce lessons
learned that tended to highlight the importance of their own
branch or branches. For example, the July 1991 issue of Foreign
Military Review also contained an assessment of preparing avia-
tion forces for Operation DESERT STORM. 51 This article played
particularly close attention to the integration of naval aviation
into the air campaign. The importance of the navy and the TOMA-
HAWK SLCM was the subject of another article in the same issue. 52
General-Lieutenant Skuratov wrote another analysis of the
Gulf war in the June 1991 issue of Naval Digest that tended to
highlight the importance of his own combat arm as a defense
against TOMAHAWK SLCMs. Skuratov proposed building a "new
operational antiship missile system equal in range to Tomahawk
missile capabilities." Subsequent articles appeared in later
issues of the main navy journal highlighting the need for new
maritime weapons systems that would be able to operate in the new
military-technological environment caused by the scientific-
technical revolution demonstrated in the Persian Gulf.
In the Summer of 1991, when the U.S. was considering renew-
ing combat operations against Iraq because of its failure to live
up to the terms of the cease fire, the Soviets took note that the
lead elements for such strikes would consist of aviation units
and TOMAHAWK SLCMs. 55
The first consolidated U.S* lessons learned from the Persian
Gulf war appeared in July 1991. Assuming that this report was
purchased by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and other Soviet
researchers, it would have been available in translation for
their use no later than August 1991.
After the publication of the initial series of substantive
analyses, we began to see deliberate uses of the lessons of the
Persian Gulf to make points in commentary on other related is-
sues. For example, Army General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, a
serious Soviet military intellectual, wrote a major contribution
in the debate over military reform in the August 1991 issue the
General Staff Academy's journal Military Thought. In a section
of the article dealing with the nature of a defensive doctrine,
Gareyev made a case against a passive-only form of defense using
the recent war in the Persian Gulf as his proof.
In another article in the same issue, another Soviet general
officer offered his contributions on the military reform debate
with explicit comments favoring the use of aircraft and other
high technology weapons in lieu of ground forces. General-Major




"the experience of military operations in the
Persian Gulf zone showed that in the vary
near future the delivery of a surprise first
strike and numerous subsequent massive mis-
sile, air-space and electronic strikes in
combination with strikes by naval forces may
decide the outcome of war without the inva-
sion of enemy territory by ground force
groupings. "
General Korotchenko' s comments above included an endnote to the
journal U.S. News and World Report, but one should interpret that
as an attempt to allow him to make a controversial point with the
aid of a Western surrogate. This is a standard practice in the
Soviet literature. Korotchenko spends the remainder of the arti-
cle essentially justifying this conclusion. Of note, also, is
the use of the new term "electronic strikes."
Post-Coup Lessons Learned
With the coup attempt in the Soviet Union, came a new cast
of characters involved with the most serious aspects of the
debate over military doctrine and reform. Army General Vladimir
Nikolayevich Lobov, having been the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw
Pact Joint Armed Forces and then head of the Frunze Military
Academy, was appointed as Chief of the General Staff after the
August 1991 coup attempt. General Lobov was no stranger to the
debate over military doctrine and strategy and is a first rate
academic in his own right, but his earlier banishment to the
Frunze Academy indicated a lack of support from his seniors.
In one of his first interviews, while serving in this new
position, in Izvestiya
,
published on September 2, 1991, Lobov
used the opportunity to argue for improved quality of armed
forces hardware due to the lessons learned from the Gulf war.
Lobov specifically stated that the Persian Gulf war should not be
looked on as "merely an episode," implying that he sided with
those who viewed the war as the basis for the development of
military doctrine and organizational development of the Soviet
armed forces. We should not forget that Lobov' s appointment was
preceded by that of the former Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the
Air Force, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, to
the post of USSR Defense Minister. Shaposhnikov was viewed as a
supporter of a shift in emphasis to air power.
On August 31, 1991, General-Colonel of Aviation Petr Stepa-
novich Deynekin was appointed to the position of CinC of the
Soviet Air Force. On September 5, 1991, he told a news inter-
viewer that Operation Desert Storm confirmed that a "tank fleet
of 40,000 vehicles in our country is pointless in modern warfare
since the tanks would be burned by helicopters within hours.
"
61
Such a statement by the head of a service was unheard of in
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earlier days. Support for the position that airpower should
dominate the new Soviet military doctrine and reform received
added emphasis from additional articles that appeared from time
to time. 62
The ground forces were not about to take this frontal as-
sault lying down. In an November 28, 1991 interview in Red Star,
the chief of the Ground Forces Main Staff responded that although
"in the Persian Gulf the situation was such that aircraft played
the leading role... this in no way belittles the significance of
ground forces' military actions in the attainment of the ultimate
goal." 63
In what appears to be a major post-coup summary report of
the lessons learned from the Gulf War, two Soviet general offic-
ers and a colonel wrote a major article in the last USSR issue of
the General Staff Academy's journal Military Thought. 4 The
article is replete with nuances that make it necessary to under-
stand what debates were ongoing at the time for which "lessons"
of Operation DESERT STORM were used to support certain positions
in that debate.
In this final USSR Military Thought issue article on the
Persian Gulf lessons, the Soviet military authors did compare the
use of conventional weapons to the use of weapons of mass de-
struction. Although they acknowledged the importance of the
offensive air operation, they did not agree that air forces made
the "decisive contribution" toward winning victory in the Persian
Gulf. The authors further stated that "only the defeat of the
Iraqi Armed Forces main grouping as a result of the land opera-
tion by multinational troops forces Saddam's [Hussein] leadership
to decide on an unconditional cease fire. The air bombardment
did not lead to the Army's defeat."
This article also acknowledged that "conventional weapons
were used during the war which are capable of acquiring a strate-
gic character with massive employment." In conclusion, the
authors concluded that the "military lessons of the Persian Gulf
armed conflict are unique," thereby siding themselves against
General Lobov, who had said that it was not "merely an episode."
Lobov, incidentally, was fired as Chief of the General Staff on
December 7, 1991, five days before the last issue of the USSR
Military Thought was signed to press.
In one of the rare commentaries on the Persian Gulf war by
the former Navy CinC, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Nikolayevich
Chernavin in early January 1992 took a public stand on these
issues. Chernavin stated in an interview (emphasis added):
"The war in the Persian Gulf convincingly
showed the significance of the maritime
sector: Iraq was blockaded from the sea, the
air force and navy carried out the main,
basic strikes from the sea, they effectively
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decided the outcome of the hostilities, and
only when the resistance of the Iraqi Army-
had been finally crushed, did the ground
troops move forward. This example graphical-
ly demonstrates that war today is different,
it does not resemble previous ones, which
began with soldiers crossing a border and




The major discussion point in the Soviet and Russian litera-
ture about the Persian Gulf war appears to have been over whether
a ground offensive was necessary or not. Related to this major
discussion item are subsidiary dialogues relative to the role of
high technology, specifically precision guided munitions. Gener-
ally speaking, analysis of maritime aspects of the war was less
important than these major considerations. Consequently, Western
readers should not review only those Soviet and Russian sources
that deal with only the maritime aspects of the war in order to
understand the true view of those considerations.
Commentary on Operations DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM must
be also visualized in the context of what it is that the U.S.,
and other Western, armed forces were capable of vis-a-vis a
Soviet- trained and equipped client state. Comments on the war
are invariably comments on how well Soviet equipment and training
stacked up against the heretofore most likely enemy of the USSR.
Naturally there was a bias in Soviet and Russian literature to
use the lessons of the Persian Gulf war to make points, that
otherwise were not going to be made, about the author's views on
the adequacy of Soviet/Russian military equipment and training
and that of the U.S. and the West.
Soviet and Russian commentary about Operations DESERT SHIELD
or DESERT STORM must also be seen in the context of the internal
debates that were ongoing over the new military doctrine and
strategy. Again, the bias of most authors was to use the lessons
of the Persian Gulf war to make points that they otherwise would
have made about the future direction of the Soviet and then the
Russian armed forces.
Generally, this section has reported on the lessons of the
Persian Gulf war as reported by various military and civilian
Soviet and Russian authors during discrete time periods. The
reader was introduced to the debates over Soviet military doc-
trine and strategy in the previous section. The subsequent
debates and reform movement will be developed in later sections.
We must also consider important and subsequent political events
in the former Soviet Union and review the changes to traditional
elements of military doctrine and strategy. It is to these
issues that this report will now turn. The final sections of
this report will address implications for the U.S. and the West.
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IMPACT OF THE AUGUST 19 91 COUP
Because of the on-going studies of Operation DESERT STORM,
the Soviet Union was undergoing a thorough discussion of the
military-technical aspects of doctrine prior to the August 19,
1991 coup attempt. With the coup, and the appointment of an Air
Force officer as the new minister of defense, the West looked for
indications of a shift in military doctrine. The first post-coup
indications of the impact of the coup on military doctrine were
from Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, the new
Soviet Defense Minister. Shaposhnikov stated on August 26, 1991
that Soviet military doctrine would remain defensive and based
upon the concept of sufficiency, a concept that had yet to be
fully clarified but one that was at the heart of the debate over
future strategy and forces.
Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov was relieved of his
duties as the head of the Frunze Military Academy and appointed
the new Chief of the USSR General Staff. Within days of his
appointment, he gave an interview outlining some possible changes
in military thinking in the Soviet Union. Lobov stated that the
main thrust of his doctoral dissertation had been to "achieve
goals for the lowest possible expenditure of forces, resources,
and time." Marshal Shaposhnikov echoed this new theme in a
parallel interview.
Shaposhnikov announced later in September 1991 that a funda-
mental review of military doctrine was on-going and would involve
the new republic defense committees. In an October 1, 1991
newspaper article, Lobov reiterated that the review was indeed
underway and provided some details. Lobov' s article clearly
stated that cost-effectiveness would be a criteria and that the
doctrine would truly be defensive that "will not cause anyone any
anxiety." Lobov went so far as to say that the Soviet Union did
"not regard anyone as an actual enemy."
A Vienna seminar on military doctrine with representatives
from 38 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) was the site of an explanation of the basic tenets
of Soviet military doctrine. General-Colonel Bronislav Ome-
lichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed
Forces, told his audience that a single coalition military doc-
trine would govern the post-coup USSR armed forces. Omelichev
added that "aggression can scarcely be successfully repulsed by
means of passive actions."
On October 23, 1991, the Ministry of Defense published a
major interview with the Chief of the General Staff. In this
interview, Lobov stated some new ideas for military doctrine,
including: that conflict in the future must be localized, but
that "external functions" could not be ruled out. He also admit-
ted that: "there has hitherto been no correlation between our
officially proclaimed defensive goals and the offensive thrust of
operational-strategic principles in the sphere of military art
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and the development and combat training of troops and naval
forces.
"
The most substantive discussion of post-coup Soviet military
doctrine was in an October 1991 article by General Lobov, in the
General Staff's prestigious journal Military Thought . Lobov'
s
article contained a thorough discussion of the need to revise
Soviet military doctrine, retaining its defensive character,
because of the coup and the "victory by democratic forces."
The new Chief of Staff explained this victory in terms that
were more concrete. Although Lobov stated that the republics
might "delegate broad rights and obligations to the Center in the
sphere of defense and military policy," he also acknowledged that
they might not, necessitating a coalition military doctrine
rather than an unified doctrine and unified armed forces. Lobov
made it clear that under the new sociopolitical, inter-ethnic,
and ideological realities, it was "impossible to organize nation-
al defense on the previous principles" and that defense decision-
making would be shared with new elements of the society.
Even more importantly, Lobov acknowledged that "under the
new conditions the economic bases of the country's defense cap-
ability do not support Armed Forces 's needs and require substan-
tial reform." Lobov stated that national defense must be "eco-
nomical to the maximum and not difficult for the state." Hence,
Lobov 's basic argument was that although military doctrine would
retain its defensive character, it would have to change due to
these rather important sociopolitical and economic factors.
The Chief of the General Staff discussed his concept of
military defense in terms that agreed with Shaposhnikov: "any
aggressive intentions are alien to us;" "our defensive measures
must not generate even the slightest alarm in anyone;" "defense
as the basic form of military operations in repelling
aggression." To be even more explicit, Lobov stated that:
"We are obligated to convince the world that
we never will begin combat operations against
anyone whomsoever under any conditions, with
the exception of cases either where we our-
selves are the object of attack or where
armed intervention with other democratic
states will be required under UN aegis in a
region where a real threat arises to the
peace and security of peoples."
The need for a military defense, especially against a con-
ventional attack, of the Soviet Union has not always been under-
stood nor appreciated by Western leaders and analysts. Although
most Westerners have never considered large-scale offensive
military operations against the USSR as a realistic possibility,
there were those in the Soviet Union who really feared an attack
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would come if they did not remain armed to the teeth, or at least
used this threat of an attack as justification for large mili-
tary expenditures. This post-coup embrace of defensive defense
by Shaposhnikov and Lobov were an attempt to ensure that everyone
knew on which side of the debate they had made their stand. It
was also a signal of future trends in strategy and force struc-
ture for the rest of the military.
The USSR was essentially without a national command authori-
ty (NCA) for some few days in August 1991. It was never more
vulnerable than during the coup and perhaps more recently during
the winter of 1991-92. Yet the only "attack" that came from the
West was the massive influx of advisors, politicians, and aid.
The lack of attack by the West, which had been warned about by
the Soviet military for years, did not go unnoticed, and under-
mined the efforts of Soviet "hawks" to argue that even more
resources needed to be devoted to defense.
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IMPACT OF THE DEMISE OF THE USSR
Military doctrine was discussed in November -December 1991,
this time in conjunction with efforts to create a Union of Sover-
eign States and the aborted attempt to sign a new Union Treaty. 1
With the assumption of a continued Union, the Soviet Ministry of
Defense rapidly developed another new military doctrine that did
not name any nation or block as an external enemy. This new
doctrine did not envisage the USSR coming under simultaneous or
even sequential attack from several directions. It called for
mobile ground defense forces based in peacetime upon corps and
brigades rather than offensive ground forces based upon fronts.
The late 1991 doctrine characterized security at three
levels: national (security of the sovereign states), regional
(cooperation with external blocks and nations) , and global
(cooperation with the United Nations) . A Soviet general officer
attempted to add substance to the issue of doctrine by claiming:
"Our general Staff understands strategic stability as a condition
of interstate relations characterized by resistance to the effect
of destabilizing factors."
Apparently, the entire military did not agree with the
directions that the Ministry of Defense were being forced to take
because of the new sociopolitical and economic realities. The
final two 1991 issues of the USSR General Staff's journal Mili-
tary Thought, signed to press on December 12 before it was fully
apparent that the Soviet Union was going to cease to exist,
included a series of articles that directly challenged any whole-
sale shift to a defensive military doctrine that relied on defen-
sive military operations as their primary form of combat. The
following extracts provide the flavor of many of the more outspo-
ken articles.
"The declaration only of defense and only of retaliatory
operations in Soviet military doctrine probably will not accom-
plish the tasks either of educating the people or of deterring
aggression against the USSR. "A defense incapable of creating
necessary conditions for launching a decisive offensive will not
fulfill its mission and will not lead to success in defending the
homeland. "In no case should doctrine stereotype of 'castrate'
military art." "One should proclaim the right to repel aggres-
sion using all kinds, forms and methods of military operations.
"It is not precluded that future military operations will extend
to the opposing side's full territory." 8
Trends in warfare were carefully developed with conclusions
including that further cuts in the military would require preemp-
tive strikes in order to successfully perform a defensive opera-
tion. Although these articles did appear and the journal Mili-
tary Thought has generally been predictive of trends in the
Soviet military, these articles appear to represent the last
efforts of the Soviet military to state their case for a strong
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defense under what were now totally unrealistic pre- coup sociopo-
litical conditions.
With the formal demise of the USSR at the end of 1991, the
military quickly announced plans for a joint CIS military doc-
trine. lC The military's preferred position initially was that
the CIS was simply the USSR with another name. 11 The former USSR
Ministry of Defense essentially simply reformed itself into the
High Command of the CIS Armed Forces. Under initial plans, the
chief defense tasks for the CIS in wartime included the "defeat
of the aggressor and the creation of conditions for the quickest
end of the war and the restoration of a just and lasting peace;"
essentially the same words found in the 1990 USSR draft.
When the CIS failed to function as a state, both military
and civilian advisors began to agitate for the creation of repub-
lic military doctrines in Russia and the Ukraine instead. Russia
resisted creating its own republic armed forces hence continued
to place a great deal of emphasis on the formulation of a CIS
military doctrine and strategy instead. Eventually, the individ-
ual republics began to formulate their own views on military
doctrine and the Commonwealth was likened to the British Common-
wealth of Nations.
The Ukraine took the lead on preparing their own military
doctrine. Fears that the Ukraine would prepare for military
operations beyond its own borders were specifically refuted by
the Ukrainian minister of defense. Belarus, which had indicat-
ed that it was in no hurry to form separate armed forces, began
to develop the initial concepts of their own military doctrine;
one quite different than that which used Belarus as simply a
"Cossack encampment on the empire's Western borders." Even
Moldava made it clear that "its territory would not be used by
foreign forces for the preparation or conduct of offensive action
against other countries." Eventually, most former Soviet
republics began to formulate their own individual military doc-
trines .
In early 1992, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Sha-
poshnikov, in his new capacity as Commander of the Commonwealth
Armed Forces, stated that a new military doctrine for the CIS
would remain defensive, although some of its provisions would
have to be changed. The military's preferred position was that
combat operations cannot be oriented toward passive defense. One
major article published immediately upon the demise of the USSR
stated that "with the outbreak of aggression, all restrictions in




Numerous other articles have followed, indicating that the
basic thrust of the strategic defense, being either operationally
defensive or offensive, remains a major subject of debate. 1 ^ One
possible way to interpret these remarks is that for programming
purposes, the military might have to accept that it will plan
only for defensive operations, but, if war were to actually
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occur, during the execution of plans, no such restrictions need
apply.
One multi- authored article advocating a new doctrine was
especially critical of politicians who had not yet internalized
the lessons of Operation DESERT STORM and only thought of a
ground forces invasion with frontal military operations in border
and coastal areas. The military authors of this article advo-
cated, instead, forces necessary to defend against the more
likely air invasion as seen in Operation DESERT STORM. They
promoted a concept of active combat ready forces designed to
support nuclear deterrence and to repel an air attack with active
forces. Mobilized reserve general purpose forces sufficient for
the conduct of full-scale military operations in all spheres if
there were a threat of a land campaign.
Another significant article was prepared by General Konstan-
tin Ivanovich Kobets, then- Russian Federation State Counselor for
Defense, and leading proponent for the creation of a separate
Russian military doctrine. Kobets stated that a Russian military
doctrine should include vigorous defense but not carrying the
conflict beyond her own borders. Russian Vice President Alek-
sandr Rutskoy gave a television interview in mid- February that
stated that the emerging strategy would be based upon the "prin-
ciple of a defensive doctrine."
The 1990 draft military doctrine specifically identified the
principal military danger to the USSR as the high levels of
military confrontation, the U.S. military-political policy of
"from a position of strength, " and the presence of foreign mili-
tary bases and forces around the territory of the former USSR.
These are the same type of words being used by a few holdovers in
the Russian military who continued to argue that there was an
external threat facing Russia today.
The leadership of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada has
been quite vocal about whether or not there is an external enemy.
The Institute's director, Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, stated in
February 1992 that although a threat to security still exists, a
threat from within is more likely. Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov,
Deputy Director of the Institute wrote, in early March, that
external events would probably not directly affect Russia's state
security and echoed his director that the most important threats
are internal. 5
Another Deputy Director of the Institute of the U.S.A. and
Canada gave an important interview in mid-March just prior to his
being officially named (on April 3^ 1992) as one of the two new
Russian Deputy Defense Ministers. Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin
stated that security for Russia was best obtained by a combina-
tion of restructured high- technology branches of the armed forces
which would be backed up by "centrally based rapid deployment
forces, which can be thrown in the shortest possible time into
any region of the CIS to repulse external aggression, to end
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conflict on favorable terms acceptable to us." He added that the
mission would be to rapidly curb the escalation of the conflict.
The Russian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution on April 1,
1992 that gave the priorities for the establishment of an inde-
pendent military policy for the Russian Federation. Appended to
this declaration was an appended statement from the Presidium
that provided additional details. Included were the following
concepts: (1) formation of a Russian military establishment on
the basis of a sufficient level of defense, (2) sufficiency in
strategic nuclear forces is to also include the minimal cost, (3)
the basic factor in deterring large-scale and local wars against
Russia and other CIS states should be forces possessing high-
accuracy weapons and means of delivery, (4) the prompt neutrali-
zation and localization of local conflicts shall be accomplished
by highly mobile general purpose forces, and (5) the need for a
collective defense system.
General -Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, also about to be
announced as a Russian Deputy Defense Minister (on April 3), gave
an interview published on April 1, 1992 in which he outlined his
view of emerging Russian military doctrine. It included empha-
sis on rapidly deployable forces, which he defined as airborne
troops and marines, to meet any external threat. He added that
ground forces with powerful tank components were no longer re-
quired by Russia.
Announcements, including one by Russian President Boris
Nikolayevich Yeltsin, on April 7, 1992 of a new Russian military
doctrine indicated that it would be purely defensive. A state-
ments from Marshal Shaposhnikov, Commander in Chief (CinC) of the
CIS Joint Armed Forces, on the same day included that the Russian
military needed to be strong enough to accomplish its tasks
"independently or in conjunction with the Joint Armed Forces [of
the CIS] and to worthily represent a great power in the interna-
tional system."
Andrey A. Kokoshin, now the Deputy Russian Defense Minister
told a Radio Moscow interviewer, on April 6, that the Russian
armed forces "will be purely defensive and will never pose a
threat to either neighboring or other countries." In a subse-
quent newspaper interview, Kokoshin stated that "we should nor
rely too much on nuclear deterrence."
In early May, Colonel -General Viktor Nikolayevich Samsonov,
Chief of the CIS General Staff, gave an interview that indicated
that the general purpose forces of the Russian Army would be
based upon the concept of mobile defense without the formation of
forward-based strategic echelons. 3 President Yeltsin added in
an interview that a mobile Russian Army "should be capable of
reacting instantly to any critical situation.
"
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At the mid-May 1992 parliamentary hearings over the new law
to create Russian armed forces, one General Staff officer ex-
plained that the armed forces would "abandon continuous defense
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along the entire perimeter of the state borders. 35 Furthermore,
he stated that "infantrymen" must "stop thinking about a future
large-scale war requiring districts and fronts."
After the CIS Tashkent summit in May 1992, Russian Acting
Defense Minister, General -Colonel Pavel S. Grachev, said that
Russia would create "rapid reaction force" that would be sent to
whatever sectors were defenses are under threat . Ground forces
"located on the defense perimeter will be significantly reduced,
and several fully manned divisions will remain in each military




At the end of May, 1992, a four-day conference was held at
the Academy of the General Staff on the "Military Security of
Russia." Acting Russian Minister of Defense Grachev's conclud-
ing speech apparently contained criticism of previous views of
nuclear weapons and the "strictly defensive" nature of military
doctrine. ° Grachev stated that in the event of aggression,
Russia has the right to choose those means of combat which it
deems most effective in the existing situation.
General Grachev told the conference that a draft Russian
military doctrine would be prepared and submitted to Russian
President Boris Yeltsin by July 1, 1992. In the post -Tashkent
environment, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan began to develop their
own independent military doctrines. 9 The Baltic republics have
ently signed a protocol settinc
ooperation in the military sph<
appar ng up a single defense system
and c ere.
It is unlikely that there will be a CIS military doctrine
since the CIS is not a state and not all the members are willing
to cooperate in a formal defensive arrangement. Instead, each
republic will create its own military doctrine, perhaps in the
form of a legislative action. Those that join defensive al-
liances will include in their doctrines provisions for such an
eventuality. 42 The November 1991 draft USSR military doctrine
discussed such endeavors and the March 1992 draft Russian consti-
tution contains a clause permitting alliances and joint armed
forces.
The former Soviet Union is undergoing another thorough
discussion of military doctrine. The resulting military doc-
trines will affect the reformulation of military art: military
strategy, operational art, and tactics, and the organizational
development of the armed forces. Of interest in the discussions
about military doctrine are the general lack of mention of mari-
time aspects of security.
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SOCIOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY DOCTRINE
Some aspects of the previous Soviet military doctrine in-
dicate how the Russians think about war. Military doctrine was
split, under the Soviet model, into sociopolitical and military
technical aspects. Recent discussions of military doctrine in
Russia and other republics indicate that this model has been
retained. 1
A major sociopolitical characteristic or class of war is a
war in defense of the homeland. Wars in defense of national
independence were always listed by the Soviets as just wars. Such
wars have not been renounced by the leadership of the governments
of any of the former Soviet republics and there is no reason to
assume that a defense of the new homelands would not be consid-
ered just. After all, preparation for wars in defense of the
homeland is the objective raison d'etre for all national armed
forces.
What has changed, however, is the urgency that the former
Soviet republics need to apply to their legitimate need to pro-
vide for self-defense against an external Western threat. In-
deed, there have been a number of statements by the Soviet, CIS,
and Russian republic's most senior military officers that any new
military doctrine would not view any specific state or alliance
as an enemy.
One general officer indicated in March 1992 that the mili-
tary was very concerned that the creation of large republic armed
forces will lead to large-scale combat operations and "that
neighboring states will be drawn in." Another general officer
stated in April that the present danger "is generated by con-
flicts within the nation." Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich
Kravchuk was vocal about the need for military guarantees for his
republic given the territorial claims of Russia against the
Ukraine. Russian Vice President General-Major of Aviation Alek-
sandr Rutskoy told an international conference, in May 1992, that
the danger to the security of Russia is posed by the so-called
local conflicts which today have a considerable part of the
former USSR in their grip: Moldava, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia,
etc. 6
With civil wars raging within the former USSR, one can logi-
cally conclude that these type of wars, rather than the old
external threat, will most likely occupy the attention of the
military commands of the newly emerging republics. The CIS states
must have agreed because ten republics drew up and signed a pact
in March 1992 that renounced the threat or use of force between
themselves. A subsequent meeting in April at Bishkek between
the heads of state of Central Asian republics resulted in a
similar declaration. At the May 15, 1992 CIS summit at Tashk-
ent, six former Soviet republics signed a formal treaty that
pledged they would resolve all disagreements between themselves
by peaceful means.
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The March 20, 1992 CIS Kiev summit resulted in the agreement
to form internal peacekeeping forces. These volunteer forces
would be brought into areas of interethnic conflict with the
consent of all parties. They would be subordinate to the Council
of Heads of State and operate outside of the regular armed
forces. ° Following the Tashkent summit, Russian First Deputy
Minister of Defense Andrey A. Kokoshin remarked in an interview
that the CIS joint armed forces should be judged effective if
they minimized conflicts in the CIS [emphasis added]. 1
Another new area for military doctrine concerns the partici-
pation of Russian armed forces in cooperation with the other
nations of the world. The Soviet Union offered to participate in
Operation DESERT SHIELD, but was politely rebuffed. Offers of
future, especially maritime, participation can be found in subse-
quent Soviet literature. 12 Russia provided a 900-man battalion
of troops for peacekeeping duty in Yugoslavia in early 1992 and
has begun to talk in terms of a role of a regional guarantor of
stability. 13
To fully develop the sociopolitical aspects of military
doctrine, Russia, the other republics, and the CIS will need to
create, and then debate, criteria for the employment of military
forces. The U.S. went through such a debate during the Reagan
years and there is some indication that this had begun in the
USSR during the post-coup debate over military doctrine. 14
Figure 1, Character/Classification of War illustrates the
various sociopolitical characteristics of war, according to
traditional Soviet military science, and their possibility,
according to this author, in the near future.
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FIGURE 1
TRADITIONAL SOVIET SOCIOPOLITICAL CHARACTER/CLASSIFICATION OF WAR
Probability
of Occurrence
Just Unjust Current Old
Defense of Homeland X
-Defense of national independence X
-In support of allies 1 X
-Defense against internal
reactionaries X
Support for National Liberation
Wars X





or national oppression X
Imperialist Wars 2
-Protection of state sovereignty of





























1. Applies to Russia in support of former Soviet republics today
and support of Warsaw Pact and other allies in the past.
2. Reflects author's judgment on probability of imperialist wars
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MILITARY- TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY DOCTRINE
The Soviets and Russians also have traditionally character-
ized war by military- technical attributes. Although many of
these aspects have been thoroughly discussed in the past, more
recent writings indicate that there may be some new thinking
regarding the basic characteristics of warfare.
Warfare Scope and Space
War is principally defined by the space that it occupies.
Traditionally, war has been characterized as either global or
local. Traditionally, Soviet military doctrine has assumed that a
future war with the United States would automatically assume a
global character. There have always been differences in opinion
(in the USSR and the United States) concerning whether a war with
the United States could or should be limited to a single theater
of origin, yet in both superpower states, it was the "big" war
that occupied the attention of most serious programming planners.
World-class navies have traditionally argued that when a war
occurs, it will automatically be extended to the full maritime
battle space; i.e. the entire globe. After all, to assume other-
wise would be to argue that if a war were taking part in Europe,
when the warships of two belligerents passed in the Pacific, they
should render honors. Today, global war has been ruled out, for
program planning purposes in both Russia and the U.S.
We now generally expect crises to break out in a single
region. If both the U.S. and Russia now include the political
goal that the crisis should be contained to that single region,
it will require navies to forego their traditional option of
geographic escalation. This has probably a more direct impact on
the U.S. Navy's desires for global offensive actions but will
obviously affect the Russian fleet which may only have to face an
external threat from the West in one TVD rather than multiple
TVDs.
War in the former USSR has been increasingly described as
involving the defense of the territory of the individual repub-
lics rather than an extended area. Within each republic, there
may be single, two, or multiple spheres, with the possibility of
cooperative military operations with other nations or joint armed
forces.
General -Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, Acting Russian
Defense Minister, stated in a newspaper interview published on
June 2, 1992 that he was concerned that due to the collapse of
the Warsaw Pact and the creation of independent nations with
independent armies on Russia's borders, the "Moscow Military
District has essentially become a frontline location." Grachev
then confessed that he had previously proposed a "swift creation
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of a new- -Smolensk- -military district which, together with the
Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts, would comprise
the first strategic echelon."
If the Russian military retains its traditional concepts of military doctrine
and strategy, they will be predisposed to retaining traditional arrangements for
warfare space. Indeed, Grachev stated that his proposal had been not accepted
and that he was "dubbed aggressor and militarist" for his efforts.
One relatively new concept for Soviet military doctrine is
to consider separate or subordinate military doctrines or mili-
tary strategies for different geographic portions of one nation
or an alliance. For example, in an October 1991 article in
Military Thought, a general officer argued that the situation in
the European portion of the USSR was significantly different thar
that in the East or in the South. In another article in this
same journal, another general officer suggested that the balance
of forces should be created for each individual theater of mili-
tary operations (TVD) rather than as a whole.
The most significant development of this concept was pub-
lished by the civilian vice president of the Institute of Nation-
al Security and Strategic Studies in the ministry of defense's
daily newspaper Red Star in March 1992. In this article, A.
Savelyev agrees that military doctrine should be "geared toward
geographic sectors of probable threat," and that military tasks
should "be optimized according to the particular sector."
In the Western TVD, Savelyev concludes that Russia should
assume that the "enemy" will have technical superiority. The
best option for defense against this enemy is "'islands of re-
sistance' deep inside our own territory." Savelyev views the
main objective in this theater as "stopping combat operations at
the earliest possible stage" by means of "tactical counter-
strikes." The structure of armed forces in this theater should
not be "in strategic terms, be regarded as offensive."
In the Eastern and Southern TVDs, Savelyev concludes that
Russia will have technical superiority over the assumed enemy.
The best option for defense in these sectors is "forward- based"
with main defense forces deployed in peacetime in the "Russian
heartland." If the threat of an attack arises, they would be
rapidly deployed to "forward positions" and their main task would
be to "prevent the enemy penetrating deep inside our territory
and to 'repulse' it if this is not achieved during the initial
stages of the war."
If Savelyev' s concepts are accepted as a part of Russian
military doctrine, then they would have major implications for
the navy. In the Western TVD, the fleet would appear to be
relegated to an extremely defensive posture. The Southern TVD
would include significantly reduced in size fleet units in the
Black and Caspian seas with little opposition. The Eastern TVD
does not appear to be one that Savelyev associates with the U.S.
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despite years of rhetoric by the U.S. Navy with its Maritime
Strategy.
As the other republics begin to develop their own military
doctrines and strategies, we should expect to see warfare space
begin to appear on the pages of their journals. For example, the
Ukraine is probably ahead of most other former Soviet republics
in thinking about war without being simply a part of the center's
overall plan. It should not be surprising, therefore, that
scenarios, alleged to have been developed by NATO, were discussed
in their literature that included: territorial or interethnic
within Eastern Europe that intentionally involve the CIS, primar-
ily Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, or Moldava; the inadvertent spread
of conflict from Eastern Europe to the CIS or from within the CIS
to Eastern Europe; conflict between a republic or group of repub-
lics and the CIS Joint Armed Forces.
Makeup of Belligerents
The second major military- technical characteristic or clas-
sification of war is by the makeup of the belligerents, i.e. the
war is either between coalitions or simply between two belliger-
ents. Soviet literature evidence has indicated that they have
traditionally assumed that a future war with the U.S. would be a
war between coalitions; i.e. NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Under the
new international security environment, this is no longer the
case. Wars that involve Russia might still involve NATO, but
there is every possibility that warfare might take on a coalition
form but that coalition would include the former republics of the
USSR.
The Form of Warfare
A third major military- technical characteristic of war is
its form. One major category is whether the war is nuclear or
conventional. The former Soviet political leadership previously
renounced nuclear- rocket war on a scale that would equate to a
world war. This was not a renunciation of all forms of nuclear
war. Despite pronouncements that nuclear war can serve no polit-
ical purpose -- implying that it should not be fought --a just
nuclear war fought in defense of the homeland is still possible
and must be planned for by the armed forces of any nation that
retains or faces such weapons.
Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin reaffirmed the long-
standing position of the Soviet Union when he announced on
Christmas Day 1991 that the new CIS would "refrain from the first
use of nuclear arms." On the other hand, in a subsequent tele-
vision interview, the deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme
Soviet's Defense and Security Committee stated that although the
CIS would never strike first, a "retaliatory strike must be
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inflicted before the nuclear missiles explode on our
territory."* This suggestion that strategic nuclear weapons
might be launched upon receipt of warning of an incoming attack
is now new in the Soviet literature and is a theme that we need
to follow as CIS and Russian military doctrine are more fully
developed. 11
The maritime aspects of nuclear war have been an area for
much discussion. Clearly the Soviets and other countries have
the capability to fight a nuclear war in the maritime theaters.
It is extremely unlikely, however, that the decision to use
nuclear weapons at sea will be made based upon issues in the
maritime theaters. 12 Therefore it is unlikely that the Soviets
would risk nuclear war ashore by going nuclear first at sea.
The United States position on nuclear war at sea was made
explicitly clear by Caspar W. Weinberger, then Secretary of De-
fense, when he stated that it is "our policy objective of denying
the Soviets the ability to limit a nuclear war to the sea." In
other words, although the U.S. might not like to fight a nuclear
war at sea, if the Soviets were to initiate one there, it is
American declaratory strategy to not allow such operations to be
limited to the sea.
Obviously the actions taken by President George Bush at the
end of September, 1991, to remove tactical nuclear weapons from
U.S. Navy fleet units will have a profound implication for any
war planning in Russia. If the Russians were to initiate nuclear
war at sea, unless the U.S. had reconstituted its sea-based
tactical nuclear war-fighting capability, it would probably have
to consider escalation to use of strategic nuclear systems. On
the other hand, if Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated that
conventional systems can substitute for nuclear warheads, then
there might not be a need for this.
Other types of nuclear war that must be planned for include:
accidental or inadvertent nuclear wars, local nuclear wars (with
China, for example) , and nuclear escalation out of a crisis. In
addition, the Russians must continue to be interested in nuclear
war as a hedge against the possibility that arms control efforts
to eliminate nuclear weapons will be unsuccessful.
Although the three other nuclear republics in the CIS
(Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine) have now indicated their
willingness to become non-nuclear states, there were some indica-
tions that the Ukraine considered keeping nuclear weapons and
relying on nuclear deterrence for their security. Similarly,
there were indications that Kazakhstan was considering retaining
nuclear weapons for deterrence and "a guarantee for the Turkic
world." 15
Extended deterrence by Russia over allied republics of the
former Soviet Union appears to be part of the new security ar-
rangement after the Tashkent CIS summit. Kazakh President Nur-
sultan A. Nazarbayev reportedly used the term "nuclear umbrella
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over all signatories" after the signing of a defensive treaty at
the summit. In a follow-on article, one observer noted that:
"Moscow can provide nuclear guarantees for
countries that have joined the 'defense
space' with it and by way of security, can
site its nuclear bases extraterritorially in
Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, for instance. As
the Americans did for decades in Europe."
Planning must be done for conventional war, but with due
regard for the lessons of Operation DESERT STORM and the new
political realities of possible locations of wars; i.e. internal
rather than external. Following the major debates that occurred
following the Persian Gulf War, one can conclude that Russian war
planning will predominantly consider defensive local conventional
military operations.
Combat operations in such wars will be combined arms but
favor actions that can be taken by air and naval forces first and
then highly mobile ground forces fighting a war of maneuver
rather than position. Mobile ground forces appear to be required
under a new military doctrine based upon mobile defense. 1 '
An assumption that military operations will be essentially
conventional in character without the possibility of using nu-
clear weapons has profound repercussions. The character of
military operations, the composition and organization of the
armed forces will all be affected.
The Pace of War
The fourth major military-technical characteristic and
classification used to describe wars is pace. Whether a war is
fast moving or prolonged is somewhat related to the other three
previous characteristics. It is usual for the Soviets to break a
war into periods (termed the "periodization" of a war) no matter
what length there is to the war itself. In historical analysis
of past wars, great emphasis is placed upon the initial period of
a war, indeed this term rates an extremely lengthy entry in the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia. 19
The initial period of war, as discussed in the Soviet liter-
ature until recently, emphasized the speed at which decisions and
actions needed to be taken. Indeed, the U.S. intelligence com-
munity often stressed how the Soviets felt that there would be
little time to generate forces prior to the commencement of
hostilities. 20 Under the new international political realities,
concern over the initial period of war may shift to that of a
steady and prolonged period of mobilization.
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A cursory review of Soviet military journals published since
the announcement of the new defensive military doctrine in 1987
reveals a great deal of interest in the initial period of the
Second Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet Armed Forces strug-
gled on the strategic defensive. In the periodization of a war,
there always appears to be a turning point or breakthrough period
in which the initial defensive operations were replaced by the
counteroffensive and finally the strategic offensive.
Before the outbreak of the Second Great Patriotic War, the
USSR deployed slightly more than half (56 percent) of its Ground
Forces divisions, some 170 divisions and 2 brigades (2,901,000
personnel) , to the defense of state borders in the Western Thea-
ter of Strategic Military Operations (WTVD) . 1 The Soviets de-
ployed 56 divisions and 2 brigades in the first echelon of its
border-defense armies. Each first echelon division was responsi-
ble for some 100-120 km of the border when it followed mountains
or rivers and 25-3 km in the most important axes. There were 52
divisions in second echelons and 62 divisions in reserve deployed
some 25-75 km from the state border. The General Staff's May
"1941 State Border Defense Plan" also provided for additional
reserves in interior military districts. These reserve forces
were to be used to deliver counterthrusts and to man defensive
lines 100-150 km from the borders.
In a November 1989 interview, the late Marshal of the Soviet
Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General
Staff, offered some very specific views about how long the defen-
sive period of a war might last. He implied that the role of the
defensive, during the first few weeks of the initial period of a
future war, was to allow the political leadership the opportunity
to terminate the crisis before it erupted into a major armed
conflict and war. If the political leadership failed, Akhro-
meyev implied that the military would then be unleashed to per-
form its normal function of crushing and decisively routing the
enemy. 22
The 1990 draft defensive doctrine also attempted to deal
with the length of the defensive period. It stated that "defense
is the principal form of military operations with the beginning
of aggression. Subsequent operations by the USSR armed forces
are determined by the nature of the enemy's military operations
and depend on means and methods of warfare he is using." The
draft also revealed that the defensive mission of the Soviet
armed forces in the event of aggression is to repel it, to defend
state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to create
"conditions for the most rapid cessation of war and the restora-
tion of a just and lasting peace."
A previous debate within the framework of Soviet military
science covering the initial period of a war may prove instruc-
tive on the topic of initial defensive operations. During 1922-
1941, questions arose regarding how long border skirmishes and
diplomatic exchanges would last before total mobilization. Mar-
shal of the Soviet Union Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov gives the
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interwar years planning interval as "several days" in his mem-
oirs. Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiley Danilovich Sokolovskiy
wrote in his 1960s-era classic book Military Strategy that the
initial period of a war might have lasted 15-20 days. Subse-
guent Soviet military textbooks have confirmed that the initial
period of a war in this era was assumed to have lasted 15-20
days. 24 During that period, the major military activites were to
have been simultaneously - limited combat actions, mobilization
and deployment.
Any discussion of the pace of war will have profound impli-
cations for the maritime services. Generally, if a war is to be
short, then navies are thought to be unable to exert their full
influence. In both the U.S. and Russia, it appears that for
planning purposes, all wars will be short. Similarly, if the
political guidance is to contain a crisis as soon as possible,
then navies may not be able to do more than sortie from their
bases and take up initial station close to home waters.
Wars of Position or Maneuver
The fifth major military-technical characteristic or clas-
sification of wars is whether or not they are wars of position or
wars of maneuver. To a large degree, this characteristic re-
sults from the previous four. One of the major Soviet lessons of
Operation DESERT STORM is that wars of position have become
passe. Although this is perhaps new for the Russian ground
forces, this is not new for the Russian navy.
Maritime war is automatically a war of mobility. The ex-
tended mobility of fleets enables them to temporarily mass other-
wise widely dispersed assets in order to concentrate fire for a
successful combat strike or battle. Mobility also allows fleets
to change rapidly from defensive to offensive formations. On the
other hand, natural geographic features can strongly suggest
positional behavior by fleets, such as barriers between islands
or the mainland and islands. 26
With so much of the earth covered by water, maritime warfare
is pursued in an environment where the surface provides few
opportunities for concealment; hence deception is more difficult
to achieve. With better knowledge of the ocean's floors, we may
find that the naval operational planner will study the terrain of
his battlefield much like his land-oriented counterpart. This
may give rise to reconsideration of certain aspects of subsurface
warfare being more warfare of position than mobility.
Findings
Figure 2, Military-Technical Character/Classification of
War, presents all of the military-technical types of war under
traditional Soviet military science. The author's judgment of
which types of war have received priority by recent political
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STRATEGIC MISSIONS
In analyzing what drove Soviet military doctrine we find
that in the USSR it was the military policy of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. In other states, and in Russia today,
military doctrine is driven by military policy. Discussions of
military policy include discussions about what constitutes the
defensive capability of a state. According to Soviet authors, we
find that the defensive capability of a state was determined by a
set of factors of war: (1) the military or combat potential of a
state, (2) its economic potential (military-economic potential is
a subset), (3) scientific potential (again military-scientific
potential is a subset), (4) social potential, and (5) moral-
political potential. Further investigation reveals that these
same words are used to describe what decides the course and
outcome of wars and what is necessary for victory at the strate-
gic-level .
During the armed conflict portion of a war, armed forces
have the opportunity to undermine, with new means, the
military/combat, military-economic, social, and moral-political
potential of their enemy, thus having a great influence on the
course and outcome of war and the attainment of victory at the
strategic- level . During the pre-armed conflict portion of war or
during the war itself, the government of a state has the oppor-
tunity to build up one's own potentials in each of these areas
and to undermine those of the enemy using economic, diplomatic,
ideological, intelligence, or scientific tools.
Figure 3 represents a matrix of these important potentials
and how they factor into a number of other aspects of political
-
military affairs. The factors and potentials are listed on the
left and the political -military aspects that they affect are



























These factors of war are clearly identified in the appro-
priate Soviet scientific reference publications and are used
widely in military-political writings. It is important to recog-
nize that these factors offer us the possibility of bridging the
gap from a discussion of war and its goals into specific military
(strategic-level) and combat (operational and tactical-levels)
operations/actions that must be undertaken to undermine an ene-
my's overall potential and therefore attain victory at each
level. It is possible to identify the level of warfare or armed
conflict which would be effected by tying the military or combat
(including naval) operations/actions to the goal to be attained.
In the Soviet, and now Russian, literature, one can clearly see
not only the use of these terms in setting the requirements for a
healthy defense but in also identifying targets for strikes
against enemies in time of war.
The traditional major strategic goals and strategic missions
of the Soviet armed forces in armed conflict were openly dis-
cussed in the military literature for many years. Some litera-
ture evidence indicates that these traditional strategic missions
were revised in accordance with the 1987 Warsaw Pact defensive
military doctrine. Figure 4 depicts these new strategic mis-
sions under a defensive military doctrine and places the combat
arms of the armed forces within them. Original Russian words are
contained in parentheses where appropriate to ensure that the
reader can correctly place key phrases in this diagram.
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The major changes in these new strategic missions were to
increase the priority given to the repelling of an enemy aero-
space attack, similar to the threat seen during Operation DESERT
STORM, and to cast strategic operations in terms of defense
rather than offense. One could, however, still read offensive
combat operations at the operational and tactical -levels of
warfare under such a defensive strategy. For example, an offen-
sive naval operation (operatsii) to seek out and destroy enemy
missile and other submarines as well as surface forces operating
close to home waters is entirely consistent with a defensive
military doctrine and strategy.
Some offensive combat operations might, however, be incon-
sistent with a defensive military doctrine and strategy. An
example would be first -nuclear strikes against enemy nuclear
missiles. Although such actions were traditionally justified as
defensive, in that they would limit damage to the homeland in the
event the war entered the nuclear phase, under the new concepts
of defensive military doctrine, they would be illogical. The
problem, of course, is that as long as Russian military forces
are capable of actually performing such actions, the other side
must take that into account regardless of stated intentions.
Prompt hard- target capable intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and open- ocean antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces are
examples of forces formerly justified and viewed by the Soviet
military as defensive but in need of scrapping if the Russians
are interested in sending a signal of intent by a reduction in
capability.
The inclusion of naval forces interdicting the sealines of
communication (SLOCs) as a subset of the suppression of military-
economic potential is another strategic mission that can be
viewed differently by either side. In a short war, the interdic-
tion of mid-Atlantic/Pacific SLOCs might not matter to the out-
come -- hence substantial resources should not necessarily be
developed for this mission. SLOC interdiction has traditionally
been thought as being more relevant during a long war. On the
other hand, a SLOC interdiction capability could, if properly
employed during the initial stages of a war, preclude an enemy
from the option of a long war - - hence serve to meet the new
political goals of ending wars quickly.
With the types of changes to military doctrine that have
been discussed since the August 1991 coup, it is clear that the
strategic missions of the armed forces will change as well.
Former Chief of the General Staff General Vladimir N. Lobov said
this in October 1991 article in Military Thought. Lobov did not
define the new strategic missions for the armed forces but,
rather, suggested that they might include "disrupting and repel-
ling an aggressor's attack, holding territory, and gaining time
to concentrate necessary forces." These themes will also need to
be watched as the Russian and other republics finalize their
emerging military doctrines and strategies.
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Perhaps the most significant changes in strategic missions
for Russia and the other republics will involve the ground
forces. For a USSR entangled in the Warsaw Pact and forward
deployed to Eastern Europe, it was proper to cast ground forces
strategic operations in terms of groups of fronts; on par with
the most demanding operations undertaken during the Second Great
Patriotic War. Even General Lobov's October 1991 Military
Thought article contained references to repulsing an invasion by
a:
"complex system of interconnected strategic
defensive operations in continental and
maritime theaters of military operations,
within the scope of which front, fleet, air,
air defense, airborne, amphibious landing,
antilanding and other operations may be
conducted.
"
With the new, less demanding, goals of military doctrine and
in the absence of a significant external threat from ground
forces, there will be no need to plan for or to field active or
maintain a rapidly mobilization capability for ground forces
capable of strategic military operations (voyennyye deystviya) .
The criteria for successful completion of military strategic
missions has undergone significant revision under the new defen-
sive doctrine. Formerly, total defeat of the enemy's armed
forces in an armed conflict was demanded as the military's con-
tribution to the overall war effort. Under a defensive doctrine,
the revised military requirement is to defeat the invading force
and simultaneously to prevent vertical and horizontal escalation
or the escalation of the conflict over time.
The political/ideological goal of traditional post World War
II Soviet war termination strategy was to ensure that the aggres-
sor could not again threaten the USSR, and that progress was made
toward eventual peace ("mir") and a world socialist order. The
political goals for war termination shifted during the Gorbachev-
era to preventing nuclear holocaust and simultaneously ensuring
the survival of the homeland. The ideological means of war would
no longer be applicable in the context of a nation that no longer
includes domination by one communist political party.
Emerging military doctrine in the former Soviet Union, as of
May 1992, did not appear to be offensively oriented in the manner
of the old theater strategic offensive operation that worried
NATO for many decades. It appears that in a struggle for power,
forces aligned with a more cost-effective defensive and high-
technology view have gained the ear of the Russian President and
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The number of and missions for Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons were to change dramatically and will change in the CIS as
well. Some spokesman have suggested a Gaullist force d'frappe as
perhaps appropriate under the new international security environ-
ment. Such a model would indicate abandonment of warfighting as
a theory of deterrence and embracing punishment as the alterna-
tive. As the strategy for deterrence and warfighting change, the
organizational structure for the nuclear forces might change as
well.
A significant amount of literature evidence, since 1987,
suggests using the U.S. McNamara-era measure of effectiveness
(MOE) associated with an assumed percentage of damage afforded to
the other's industry and population and an assured destruction
deterrence theory. Specifically some suggest that 400 equivalent
megatons (EMT) of survivable and deliverable nuclear combat
potential, is appropriate for both superpowers today. Other
articles suggest using numbers of warheads, rather than EMT, and
propose about 10 per cent of the force that will survive the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) , or about 500-600 war-
heads. A real minimal deterrence posture of "tens" of warheads
surfaced early in the debate and gained renewed interest in 1989-
1990.
As far as the former Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal
Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov was concerned in late 1989, a fully
defensive military doctrine and strategy could only occur in a
nuclear-free world! Since one could assume that a nuclear-free
world would never occur, one could also assume that Marshal Yazov
was also signaling that a defensive doctrine and strategy were
merely programming ideals and not serious. Apparently the mili-
tary was forced to take defensive sufficiency seriously enough
to define "how much was enough." "Sufficiency" in strategic
nuclear forces was defined in the November 1990 Soviet draft
military doctrine as:
"the nuclear potential necessary for deliver-
ing a retaliatory strike, the consequences of
which would wipe out any of the aggressor's
advantages.
"
Obviously, definitions that are as vague as this give a wide
degree of latitude for interpretation. Yet in the post-coup
environment, the decline of Marshal Yazov 's influence could be
seen with slight adjustment of previously stated official po-
licies. For example, Soviet General-Colonel Bronislav Omelichev,
first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces,
informed an international seminar on military doctrine in Vienna
in October 1991 that the USSR would be shifting to a minimal
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deterrent nuclear posture. 6 Omelichev specified this minimal
posture as being parity with NATO and used the Western term
"deterrence" in deference to the new international security
environment.
In a October 1991 newspaper article, General Vladimir Niko-
layevich Lobov, then-chief of the USSR General Staff, declared
that the Soviet Union would embrace a "deterrence" strategy that
hinted at punishment rather than denial of war aims (warf ighting)
as the method. Although Lobov did not use this theme in his
parallel Military Thought article, another general officer recom-
mended in the October 1991 issue that the draft 1990 Soviet
military doctrine be amended to include "mutual assured destruc-
tion" (MAD) and:
"The potential for nuclear deterrence should
not be provocative or viewed by other coun-
tries as an immediate threat to their securi-
ty. In other words, it should not be per-
ceived unequivocally as oriented toward
delivering a nuclear first strike." 8
A leading civilian critic of the military published a strong
recommendation, in mid-November 1991, to reduce nuclear warheads
to around 1,000. Then-Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation
Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov and former Soviet President Mik-
hail Sergeyevich Gorbachev responded with their own proposal of
5,000 warheads, or 1,000 below START Treaty levels. 10 With the
demise of the USSR, the authorized spokesmen for nuclear issues
shifted from the military and the head of the union to the mili-
tary leaders of the republics in which nuclear weapons were
deployed.
In early 1992, Russian Federation President Boris Nikolaye-
vich Yeltsin indicated during a trip to the West that Russia only
needed around 2,500 warheads. 11 This was followed by a series of
announcements within Russia detailing the cancellation of build-
ing programs for ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
,
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) , sea-launched cruise mis-
siles (SLCMs) , and manned bombers. Generally, these announce-
ments nave been taken seriously in the West.
The U.S. Department of Defense stated as early as September
1990 that "a short-warning or pre-emptive strategic nuclear
attack against the continental United States for the foreseeable
future... is judged to be unlikely." 12 The 1991 National Security
Strategy of the United States stated: "Despite the threat still
posed by the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons, the likelihood
of their deliberate use by the Soviet state is declining and the
scenario which we frequently projected as the precursor of their
use—massive war in Europe— is less likely than at any other time
since World War II." 13 Obviously, President George Bush's uni-
lateral actions in September 1991 to reduce America's nuclear
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alert rates and operational nuclear forces mean that he has
judged the possibility of a "bolt-f rom- the-blue" attack by the
then-USSR to be much lower than before.
Russian Federation President Yeltsin further told an Ameri-
can television audience in January 1992 that nuclear missiles
under Russian control would no longer target American cities.
Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev added in mid-March that
Russia was not targeting China or Japan either. 15 Other reports
in the Russian media indicated that despite these statements,
nothing had really changed. 16 What had probably happened is that
nuclear forces were no longer targeting foreign nations on a day-
to-day basis, but such targeting software could quickly be rein-
serted into the weapons systems if needed.
At the United Nations, Yeltsin also proposed the creation of
a world community system of global protection based upon the U.S.
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) . Follow-on literature
evidence indicates that Yeltsin is being advised by civilians
that Russia should give up its prompt, hard- target nuclear coun-
terforce forces in favor of those that are non-time urgent, less
accurate, and supportive of an assured destruction strategy.
With the formulation of the CIS, political and military
leaders attempted to calm th< world with multiple declarations
that strategic nuclear offensive forces remained under the con-
trol of the center. The CIS, however, originally did not consist
of the nuclear-capable Republic of Kazakhstan. This was recti-
fied within a few days. Continued "discussions" of strategic
forces became blurred by the military's attempt to include con-
ventional or general purpose forces that were capable of "strate-
gic" -level missions in subsequent formal arrangements for the
armed forces.
It appears that the Russians have done away with the "hair
trigger" day-to-day alert of its nuclear forces and are slowly
working out a new nuclear deterrence strategy based upon punish-
ment and not prompt war- fighting based upon denial of war aims.
If this trend continues, it will have major repercussions in the
force structures of the Russian, CIS, and Western armed forces.
However, existing offensive former Soviet nuclear forces
still far exceed that necessary for delivering a retaliatory
strike- -even under the worst-case of a surprise attack from the
U.S. Defensive systems and a research and development program to
improve those defensive systems provide continued evidence that
the Russians still have not accepted the mutual vulnerability
required under a MAD policy.
Critics of this excessive Russian nuclear capability may
have to endure this state of affairs until the Russians are able
to reduce their force structure- -not an easy undertaking. An
of fensive- capable Russian nuclear force itself does not automati-
cally indicate an offensive military doctrine or strategy.
Critics should remember that once the United States had total
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strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR—within an overall
defensive military doctrine and strategy!
Organizational Development of the Armed Forces
During the post-coup era, it became increasingly clear that
some of the Soviet republics were not going to remain in the
Union and that with such a political change, the question of
military command organizations and stationing Union forces on the
territory of individual republics was going to have to be ad-
dressed. The Ukraine's stand on independence, control of the
nuclear "button," and the subordination of Union forces to itself
became a major issue during the last days of the USSR and the
initial days of the CIS. Instead of a "civilized divorce," we
eventually saw acrimony and verbal personal attacks. These more
recent discussions over armed forces organizational development
must be understood, however, in the context of the debates that
preceded and immediately followed the August 1991 coup.
A Spring 1990 booklet provides details on what was visual-
ized by at least one civilian academic as the strategy and mili-
tary organizational development aspects of a real defensive
military doctrine (emphasis added): 19
In the area of conventional arms, defense
must be not only and not so much positional
as it is mobile. It includes meeting engage-
ments, counterstrikes, flanking strikes and a
counteroffensive with the objective of driv-
ing an invading aggressor from one's own
territory.
At the strategic level (that is, at the level
of fronts and groups of forces at the scale
of a theater of war) as well, it is quite
possible to delimit offensive and defensive
orientations. If the forces are spread out
along a forward edge, this most likely indi-
cates a defensive strategy. If the forces
are concentrated in strike "fists" in indi-
vidual sectors of the front, then one can
conclude that there are offensive plans.
From the point of view of defense, it is
optimum to have troops at the forward edge
deployed along a front (or in threatened
sectors) in fortified defensive lines and an
offensive reserve (second echelon) in the
rear for a counterattack so as to close a
possible penetration and repel the enemy.
The stronger the defense at the forward edge
and the more serious are the reciprocal
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measures of the two alliances to restructure
their military potentials under defensive
principles, the smaller is the necessary size
of the counteroffensive force and the deeper
it can be deployed in the rear without caus-
ing fear on the other side.
The mission of the armed forces and conven-
tional arms is to carry out not offensive
strategic operations in the main theaters of
war in Europe and Asia but defensive actions
for the purpose of disrupting the offensive
operations of the enemy; a prolonged conven-
tional war is impossible and the mission of
the armed forces is not to permit a victory
of the enemy in intensive short combat ac-
tions and not to allow nuclear escalation
with impunity.
A startling military reform proposal to implement a defen-
sive military doctrine was made in August 1990 by General-Major
V. Ivanov attached to the General Staff Academy. It was so far
out of touch with the "norm" of 1990 that it was largely dis-
counted in the West at the time despite the position and rank of
the author. The Ivanov proposal was routinely translated by the
U.S. government translations service, the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) , and then reprinted by the Joint
Publications Research Service (JPRS) nearly a year later due to
renewed interest. In Ivanov' s proposal, the armed forces of the
USSR were to restructure themselves into three basic contingents.
The first contingent, in General-Major Ivanov' s proposal,
were to comprise of forces in a state of permanent high combat
readiness. It would have consisted, in part, of new military
services. A new Nuclear Forces would comprehend the existing
Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as appropriate units from the
Air Force and the Navy. Space Forces would include existing Air
Defense and Antisatellite Forces. These new services were to
remain under the direct control of the USSR Supreme High Command.
The first contingent would also have consisted of highly
mobile Ground Forces, whose strength and composition could change
depending upon the international politico-military situation and
the economic potential of the USSR. This force size would be
sufficient to resolve a conflict in an individual region until
relieved by forces of the second contingent.
The requirement for the future first contingent of Ground
Forces, under General-Major Ivanov 's proposal, did not appear to
include the capability for offensive military operations at a
theater strategic-level. General-Major Ivanov gave estimates for
a first contingent force of only 1.2-1.3 million servicemen
allocated to all of the armed forces. These forces were to be
located in the entire USSR and not just within the Western TVD.
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Command and control of the first contingent would remain with the
High Command of Forces in the TVDs
.
The second contingent, according to General -Major Ivanov's
proposal, was to consist of an additional 630, 000 -man reserve
force. Up to one- third of the first contingent would form the
nucleus of the second contingent. Hardware and weapons for these
reserves were to be stored at depots and bases. This contingent
was to form the large strategic formations necessary for major
military operations in a war. The second contingent could have
probably mounted an offensive theater strategic military opera-
tion- -but before it was organized, strategic warning would be
provided.
The third contingent was to embrace, in part, some 300,000-
350,000 additional men undergoing between five and six months
training for national service. The men were to then serve for an
additional five and six months with either first and second
contingent forces, or for a longer period in newly organized
republican units, similar to the U.S National Guard. Call-up was
to take place twice a year. These forces were to augment troops
in the field should war erupt. A second part of the third con-
tingent would consist of these new republican units. The total
strength of the third contingent was to be 600,000-700,000 serv-
icemen.
Other military authors tended to tie such drastic reductions
to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; stating that a
Soviet military force incapable of conducting offensive strategic
operations should not occur until weapons of mass destruction are
destroyed worldwide. Perhaps one of the reasons that the
Ivanov proposal generated so little interest in the U.S. was that
it was quickly followed by a formal set of similar proposals from
the Ministry of Defense itself.
In a November 1990 interview, Army General Mikhail Alekseye-
vich Moiseyev, then- Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff
and USSR First Deputy Defense Minister, announced a formal series
of significant military structural reforms that gave the mili-
tary's official version of how a defensive military doctrine
would be implemented. Publication of a draft defensive mili-
tary doctrine paralleled Moiseyev' s interview. 23 Neither of these
official proposals did not go nearly as far as those suggested by
General -Major Ivanov.
The first stage of the Ministry of Defense November 1990
reform plan was to last until 1994 and consist of the complete
redeployment and resettlement of Soviet troops based on foreign
soil. The second stage (1994-1995) was to consist of the formu-
lation of strategic groupings of armed forces on Soviet territory
with a new system for training and mobilization. The third stage
was to last from 1996-2000. In this stage, further reductions,
reorganizations, and reequipping of forces would take place.
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The November 1990 Ministry of Defense draft military doc-
trine addressed some specific concepts for the deployment of
troops. For example, it specified that "the first strategic
echelon consists of troops of the border military districts and
fleet forces. Troops of internal military districts form the
strategic reserve."
By the year 2000, according to the 1990 draft plan, strate-
gic nuclear forces were to be cut 50 percent with additional cuts
possible. Ground, air, and air defense forces were to be cut by 6
percent to 2 percent. The number of generals to be cut was
1,300. The overall armed forces were to number 3-3.2 million
personnel — down from 3.9 million.
With the Ministry of Defense proposal came a public and
extremely transparent debate over both the doctrine and the
organizational development of the armed forces. Among the many
articles that appeared was a February 1991 Military Thought
article authored by General Vladimir N. Lobov, then-Chief of
Staff of the Warsaw Pact. 24 In this article, Lobov was very
critical of the overly defensive nature of the draft reforms.
Lobov' s article was typical of a large number that appeared from
military authors.
From the opposite perspective came a series of articles that
criticized the Ministry of Defense plan for not going far enough.
One extremely thorough article by a civilian academic criticized
Defense Ministry reform plan for being too offensive in its
orientation and for failing to take into account doctrinal,
strategy, and force structure changes going on in the United
States and other foreign nations. This article was perhaps one
of the most well thought-out of the many that appeared in this
major debate. The debate was temporarily interrupted by Opera-
tion DESERT STORM and analysis of its results.
Organizational development of the armed forces next appeared
as a major topic of discussion after the August 1991 coup and a
change in the leadership of the armed forces. In a Moskovskiye
Novosti interview, General Konstantin I, Kobets, then-Russian
Federation State Counselor for Defense, stated that the armed
forces would "propose combining the strategic forces—Missile
Forces, Air Defense, and the Air Force— in a single command. 26
In early September 1991, General Lobov, Chief of the USSR
General Staff, gave an interview that suggested a civilian minis-
try of defense with the armed forces "should be under the command
of the supreme commander in chief, who will have under him the
General Staff, to which all the armed forces will be subordinat-
ed." 27
In an October 1, 1991 newspaper article, General Lobov
reversed his previous criticisms of the defensive nature of the
draft reforms and embraced a series of actions that went beyond
the Yazov-era Ministry of Defense proposals. 28 Lobov suggested
that the president serve as the supreme commander in chief and
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that the military districts be redrawn to coincide with the
territory of each republic.
At a Vienna seminar on military doctrine with representa-
tives from 38 members of the CSCE, General-Colonel Bronislav
Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR
Armed Forces, informed his audience that the Soviet armed forces
would be reorganized intro four services: the Strategic Deterrent
Forces (SDF) [strategicheskiye sily sderzhivaniya]|, an air force,
a navy, and ground defense forces. 9 This order is interesting
because it places the air force and the navy ahead of the ground
forces.
General-Colonel Frants Markovskiy, first deputy head of a
main directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces
told the same audience that there were specific organizational
changes to the Soviet armed forces that demonstrated a shift to a
defensive doctrine based upon reasonable sufficiency. He
included: unilateral reductions in forces, the withdrawal of
forces from foreign territory, the scrapping of short and medium-
range nuclear missiles, the internal reorganization of divisions
making them less offensive, the elimination of "spearhead tank
forces," and the creation of a new coastal defense service in the
navy. Markovskiy provided additional details as to the composi-
tion of varying ground forces units. 31
On October 23, 1991, the Ministry of Defense published a
major interview with the Chief of the General Staff. 3 ^ In this
interview, Lobov stated that "'noncombat' militarized components
— civil defense, military commissariats, military sports and
defense societies, internal troops [MVD] , border troops [KGB],
construction troops, and railroad troops — should, in my view,
be removed from the Armed Forces structure and be redistributed
between the new center and the sovereign republics." Lobov
stated that the armed forces would be restructured into four
services, the SDF, ground defense forces, air forces, and the
navy. In using this hierarchy, the Chief of the General Staff
appeared to indicate that ground forces should retain their usual
place ahead of the air force and navy but after strategic nuclear
forces.
In his parallel October 1991 Military Thought article,
signed to press on November 11, 1991, Lobov gave a very different
listing of the armed forces. 3 The first service listed in this
article was the ground defense forces. The second service was
the navy, usually listed fifth in precedence. The SDF came third
with air and air defense forces fourth and fifth. This ranking of
services altered the leading role accorded to nuclear forces
since the creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces under General
Secretary Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev in 1959 and perhaps
indicated more support for the ground forces than was otherwise
being received from then-USSR Minister of Defense Air Marshal
Shaposhnikov. Lobov defined the SDF as the existing Strategic
Rocket Forces, the strategic nuclear forces of the air force
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(Long-Range Aviation) , and the strategic nuclear forces of the
navy.
A Ministry of Defense plan to restructure the Soviet armed
forces was published in early November 1991. Bowing to the new
power of the republics, a Council of Ministers of Defense of
Sovereign States was formed. 4 The Council was to work out
common military policy, financing, manning, and strategy for the
Union. Each republic was to be allowed to form national guard
units, modeled after Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) troops and
manned by veterans of the Soviet armed forces. All normal Soviet
armed forces would remain subordinated to the center.
The established Soviet military naturally fought hard
against the setting up of capable republic armies. In late Novem-
ber 1991, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Shaposhnikov even went
so far as to explain that this new Council of Ministers of De-
fense of Sovereign States would not itself control the Union
armed forces. Control of the normal armed forces would be exer-
cised by the Soviet defense minister, Shaposhnikov, through the
General Staff. 35 The Council of Ministers of Defense of Sover-
eign States was officially formulated at the end of November
1991. 36
Codification of the new defense arrangements was also con-
tained in a series of draft treaties prepared in November 1991.
A new draft Union of Sovereign States Treaty was prepared in mid-
November 1991. The Union of Sovereign States was to act on the
international scene formally as the sovereign state succeeding
the USSR. Joint Armed Forces of the Union of Sovereign States
were to be set up with "central control over strategic defense
including the nuclear missiles." A separate draft treaty on
collective security specified that republic armed forces would
not have nuclear weapons.
In an article published in observance of the mid-November
1991 Missile Forces and Artillery Day, General Yuriy Pavlovich
Maksimov, CinC of the USSR Strategic Rocket Forces, discussed the
forthcoming creation of a new branch of the armed forces—the SDF
that had previously appeared in General Lobov's October 1991
Military Thought article. The SDF were formally created by
decree of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. They eventually
consisted of the existing Strategic Rocket Forces (RSVN) , air
force and navy strategic nuclear forces, missile attack warning
systems, Space Attack Warning Forces (PKN) , Space Defense Troops
(PKO) , Antiballistic Missile Defense Troops (PRO) , and the Main
Directorate of Space Systems. The SDF did not include any other
general purpose or conventional forces. Maksimov was named the
first CinC of the USSR SDF.
Union ground forces were being formally re-named ground
defense troops by the end of November 1991. Ground defense
troops proposals included having only "one or two armies and one
or two corps in border districts in areas where conflicts are
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most likely." Such a concept is in total conformance with the
August 1990 Ivanov proposal to restructure the armed forces.
In a Military Hisorical Journal article signed to press in
late November 1991, Chief of the USSR General Staff, General
Lobov, again proposed organizational changes in the armed
forces. 4 ^ In another renumbering of the forces, ground defense
forces remained listed first, but then came the air force, third
the navy, and last was the new SDF. The air defense troops (PVO)
were absorbed into the ground defense troops.
In the past, there was generally conformity in the public
positions of the most senior leaders of the armed forces. During
the final days of the USSR, we witnessed a public disagreement
over organizational development between the two most senior
officers in the defense ministry. Army General Lobov himself
and later Air Marshal Shaposhnikov stated that the Chief of the
General Staff's views on military reform diverged from those of
the Defense Ministry.
Lobov openly stated that Shaposhnikov wanted public opinion
shaped to accept a civilian Minister of Defense, hence he pub-
lished a series of articles advocating splitting the higher
echelon of the military administration into two parallel struc-
tures with only the General Staff remaining purely military.
Shaposhnikov then changed his mind and Lobov was fired. General-
Colonel Viktor N. Samsonov was appointed the last Chief of the
USSR General Staff on December 7, 1991 by President Gorbachev,
one day prior to the creation of the new CIS. 45 Samsonov re-
tained this position with the subsequent creation of the CIS
Joint Armed Forces High Command General Staff on March 20, 1992.
A series of actions that involved conventional or general-
purpose forces that were capable of acting at the strategic-level
of warfare resulted in an ugly confrontation between a number of
republics. When Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk
took command of the armed forces located on their territory, it
opened up a major debate that has yet (May 1992) to fully be
resolved. When the Ukraine formed its own national armed forces,
Kravchuk' s position was that any former Soviet armed forces
physically located on the territory of the Ukraine were now part
of the armed forces of the Ukraine. This included strategic
nuclear forces and most of the Black Sea Fleet. The Ukraine
added, however, that it would turn over all nuclear weapons to
Russia for destruction. Kravchuk was adamant that "strategic
forces" included only nuclear forces in the recently-created SDF.
Russia, and the military leadership of the former Soviet
Union clearly did not want to split the armed forces and lose
control of the capability that they had so long created under the
Brezhnev years. Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin
attempted to set his republic's position on the matter when he
told a December 12, 1991 Russian Supreme Soviet session that: 46
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"The Commonwealth of Independent States will
provide for a unified military-strategic
space and unity of the nuclear forces under
single command. The shared view is to create
a defense alliance with a single command for
strategic armed forces. This marks an end to
the protracted debates about the future of
the country's nuclear potential and the fate
of the army."
The military directly and openly confronted civilian repub-
lic leaders. Marshal Shaposhnikov attempted to clarify exactly
what forces Kravchuk took command of following the formation of
Ukrainian armed forces. Shaposhnikov told a Moscow television
audience on December 13, 1992 that: 4
"We spent a long time discussing this topic
with him [Kravchuk] , and we reached full
agreement that not only strategic nuclear
forces, but also tactical nuclear weapons,
and also all the facilities providing back-up
for both strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons will be under central command."
Shaposhnikov was arguing that all of the support for the
nuclear forces also should be included in the definition of
strategic armed forces. All strategic forces, naturally, would
be subordinate to the CIS and not individual republics. Essen-
tially this would have meant the bulk of the combat arms of the
former Soviet armed forces, again the basic position of the
November 1991 Soviet Ministry of Defense reform plan. Shaposhni-
kov would have allowed modest republic armies, modeled after the
MVD.
On December 17, 1991, Russian President Yeltsin proposed
that the Soviet republics that were involved with forming the new
CIS sign a Treaty on Defense Alliance. This treaty essentially
codified the November 1991 Soviet Ministry of Defense plan for a
unified and centralized command of the bulk armed forces of the
USSR. This proposal was not adopted, however. At the December
21, 1991 CIS Alma-Ata summit, participants only signed an Agree-
ment on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons that subordinat-
ed, instead, only nuclear weapons to a joint strategic armed
force. Marshal Shaposhnikov was named the interim Commander of
the CIS joint (obyedinennyy) military-strategic space and unified
(yedinyy) nuclear armed forces. 50
A more comprehensive defense treaty, along the lines of
Yeltsin's December 17th proposal, was prepared in the closing
days of December 1991 and actively debated in the open litera-
ture. Proposals were seen for a NATO-type military alliance to a
unified armed force under single command. According to the
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Marshal Shaposhnikov and the Ministry of Defense, forces not
falling under the category of those that he commanded as the
interim commander of the joint armed forces, nuclear forces,
should be organized as separate, but centrally controlled, gener-
al purpose forces.
On December 30, 1991, the CIS heads of state met in Minsk
and signed a number of agreements that attempted to codify the
future organization and command structure of the armed forces of
the commonwealth. The attendees at Minsk signed an agreement that
governed the strategic forces remaining under joint CIS
command. 5 The agreement's definition of what constituted these
forces was vague enough, if one wanted to interpret it this way,
to include most of the armed forces of the former USSR. But the
Minsk agreement also stated that a precise schedule of "strate-
gic" forces would be drawn up with each republic in a separate
protocol. That protocol was never approved although reports of
discussions and partial agreements at the working-level surfaced
from time to time.
Another strategic forces agreement was signed by all four
nuclear republics in Minsk on February 14, 1992, but it again
failed to clarify exactly what forces were strategic. 54 It did,
however, specify that a new Strategic Forces Command was to be
created, subordinate to a CinC of the Joint Armed Forces of the
CIS. The Minsk agreement again opened up the definition of
strategic forces of the CIS beyond nuclear forces. The parties
appointed Marshal Shaposhnikov as the CinC of the Joint Armed
Forces of the CIS. A Joint Armed Forces High Command was
created that included a Joint Armed Forces General Staff. The
Minsk agreements did not include a CIS Ministry of Defense.
Instead, the CinC of the Joint Armed Forces was directly respon-
sible to the Council of Heads of State of the CIS.
Agreements with the Ukraine over divisions of the general
purpose forces were never approved. At Minsk in February,
Russia, Belarus, and six central Eurasian republics did sign a
general forces agreement that stated all military forces not
already a part of the strategic forces would be, with their
consent, operationally subordinated to the High Command of Joint
Armed Forces. 56 In addition to Russia and Belarus, this Minsk
agreement was signed by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikis-
tan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The High Command quickly set
up a new General Forces Command to take charge of these units.
Further delineation of high-level military duties and re-
sponsibilities were included an agreement on defense issues
signed at the March 20, 1992 CIS summit in Kiev. 57 The Kiev
agreement specifies that the CIS Council of Heads of State would
reserve authority over CIS military policy, doctrine, and nuclear
strategy. It also specified the defense duties of the Council of
the Heads of Government and, to a limited degree, the Council of
Ministers of Defense.
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Another agreement signed in Kiev did little more than codify
the structure of the Joint Armed Forces as being the previously
arranged Strategic Forces Command and General Purpose Forces
Command, without defining either. According to press reports,
a separate protocol listing exactly what constituted strategic
forces could not be agreed upon and was dropped from the Kiev
agenda. Russia signed both of these agreements without reser-
vations, Belarus specified that it only governed their actions
for a two year transition period, and the Ukraine did not sign.
A General Purpose Forces Agreement was also signed in Kiev
on March 20, 1992, but only by four republics—Armenia, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation. A separate
agreement appointed General Yuiry P. Maksimov as Commander of the
CIS Strategic Forces and General-Colonel Viktor N. Samsonoy as
the Chief of the General Staff of the Joint Armed Forces. 61
General-Colonel Vladimir M. Semenov was named as Commander of the
CIS General Purpose Forces, part of the Joint Armed Forces. 62
Marshal Shaposhnikov announced a few days later that the CIS
would set up a contingent of volunteer internal peacekeeping
force to be brought into areas of interethnic conflict. 6 -* These
forces were to be subordinated directly to the CIS Council of
Heads of State, and they would remain outside of the structure of
the Joint Armed Forces.
The Ukraine, and a few other republics, moved to set up
their own armed forces in early 1992 and did not participate in
the creation of these CIS general purpose forces or command
structure. The Ukraine, and later Belarus, also failed to par-
ticipate in CIS border troops agreements. One major problem with
the creation of republic armed forces, however, is that some of
the best forces and equipment from the former Soviet armed forces
ended up physically in the Ukraine and in Belarus, and therefore
became bargaining chips.
Russia followed with the creation of her own armed forces,
taking command of former Soviet forces stationed outside of the
borders of the former Soviet republics. Russia subordinated her
general purpose forces to the CIS command as permitted under the
February 1992 Minsk agreements. 66 Russian President Yeltsin
proposed a republic armed force of around 1% (later modified to
1^) million personnel. 6 This amount is only slightly more than
total discussed in the August 1990 Ivanov proposal (for the
entire USSR) and about half the size of the 1990 USSR armed
forces.
Strategic nuclear forces were also included in the Russian
armed forces but would continue to be subordinated to the CIS,
the CinC of the Joint Armed Forces, and the Commander of the
Strategic Forces. 68 This would end the question of what flag the
navy's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would
fly since the CIS is not a country and does not have a flag.
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Russia also formed its own Ministry of Defense, and split
the functions into a largely civilian ministry and a military
general staff. Yeltsin took on the post of interim Russian
Defense Minister and then on May 7 , 199? x Supreme CinC of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. 69 General-Colonel Pavel
Sergeyevich Grachev, First Deputy CinC of the CIS Joint Armed
Forces, Chairman of the Russian State Committee for Defense
Questions, and former CinC of the Airborne Troops, was initially
appointed on April 3, 1992 as Russian First Deputy Defense
Minister ° and then on May 7, simultaneously with Yeltsin's
appointment as Supreme CinC of the Russian armed forces, as
Acting Russian Defense Minister. 71 General-Colonel Leonid Vasi-
lyevich Kuznetsov was appointed as the Acting Chief of the Rus-
sian General Staff. The Russian Defense Ministry will operate
independently and only discuss questions of strategic importance
with Marshal Shaposhnikov. 73
Parliamentary hearings in mid-May 1992 indicated that Rus-
sian armed forces would be organized along the lines of the
traditional USSR—without the modifications that created the new
nuclear SDF—and without primary dominance of the armed forces by
large ground forces groupings. Russian ground forces would be
formed into two-three military groupings or districts: Western or
Eastern, or Western, Siberian, and Eastern.
A Treaty on CIS Collective Security was signed by Russia and
five Eurasian republics during the May 15, 1992 Tashkent
summit. This treaty provided for collective defense and a
Collective Security Council consisting of the heads of partici-
pating states and the Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.
Central Eurasian signatories included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This group is the same
that signed the general purpose forces agreement at Minsk in
February, 1992, except for Belarus, indicating the lack of sup-
port for any expanded cooperative defense agreement by the Euro-
pean former-Soviet republics.
In a series of post-Tashkent interviews, Russian Defense
Minister Grachev provided additional details about the organiza-
tional development of the Russian armed forces. Armed forces
located outside of the CIS would be returned to Russian territory
and form the basis of a smaller but very capable Russian armed
force. The Western Group of Forces, currently located in Germa-
ny, would be the nucleus of the Russian armed forces.
Russian troops currently located in CIS republics would also
be withdrawn to Russia as mutually agreed upon. Troops would be
withdrawn in the very near future from Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Troops would only remain in Georgia for an [unspecified] short
period. Russians would not serve in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Status of forces agreements were being negotiated with Kyrgyz-
stan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. 80 Agreements providing for
joint armed forces with Turkmenistan were drafted and were ex-
pected to be signed in June 1992. 81 A bilateral treaty on
friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance was signed later
82
with Kazakhstan with similar arrangements. Belarus took con-
trol of all military formations which were not specifically a
part of the CIS Strategic Forces 83 and Kyrgyzstan transferred all
forces on their soil to their own command. *
Russian Defense Minister Grachev also stated that the Rus-
sian armed forces would include a "new type of armed forces-rapid
deployment troops." These apparently would be based upon the
paratroops and marines — "forces capable of operating indepen-
dently in any area that poses an external threat to the country's
security." Other forces mentioned include "airborne assault
combined units, military transport and Army aviation, and mobile
support services," and "motorized rile formations, equipped
with light armaments, who can be transported by military trans-
port aircraft or MI-26 helicopters." Deputy Defense Minister
Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin added at the end of May that the new
Russian armed forces "should be like the surgeon's scalpel,
compared to the mallet or sledgehammer of the past." 9
Grachev proposed a three stage restructuring of the armed
forces. During the first stage (1992), the headquarters and
administrative structures would be reformed. Legal and juridical
foundations for the armed forces would be created. During the
second stage (1992-1994) combined and other units would be re-
formed and created. The armed forces would be cut to 2.1 million
service personnel by 1995. Mixed systems of conscript and pro-
fessional manning and alternative service would be introduced.
The third stage (1995-199) would consist of the reorganization of
the branches of service and their reduction in size to 1.5 mil-
lion.
The Russian Ministry of Defense is not the only bureaucratic
entity that will have a major say in the organizational develop-
ment of the Russian armed forces. Chairman of the Russian Feder-
ation Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov stated in a post-Tashkent
interview that the parliamentary committee for Questions of
Defense would be thoroughly involved in the reform effort.
It appears that Russian Defense Minister Grachev and Air
Marshal Shaposhnikov may not see eye-to-eye on military reform
efforts. In one post-Tashkent interview, Grachev made public a
disagreement with the CIS CinC's order issued on draft defer-
ments. Grachev, however, also stated that the functions of the
CIS Joint Armed Forces will be amended with strategic forces
remaining under joint command. 92 The Russian defense ministry
also ousted the CinC from his headquarters and moved him to the
former headquarters of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. 3
Since the function of the command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed
Forces was more like a military district rather than a war-
fighting CinC, it is likely that Grachev took the facilities that
had the most command and control support and relegated Marshal
Shaposhnikov to more austere surroundings.
Shaposhnikov told a May 26, 1992 news conference that the
Council of CIS Defense Ministers had met in his new headquarters
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and finally initialed draft agreements on the definitive composi-
tion of the CIS strategic forces. 94 To be included were the
nuclear triad of the strategic rocket forces and the nuclear
component of the air force and the navy, the systems of warning
against missile attack, anti-missile defenses and space forces.
Not included would be the bulk of the armed forces, specifically
including the Black Sea Fleet. Apparently some disagreements
remain with the Ukraine regarding strategic nuclear forces re-
maining on Ukrainian soil. 5
Russian Defense Minister Grachev gave an interview published
after this meeting of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers that
indicated that the Black Sea Fleet issue had not been solved and
that the fleet belonged to the commonwealth as a whole. 6 If
this is the ministry's position, it indicates a lack of apprecia-
tion for international law since warships must be owned by a
nation and under the command of a commissioned officer from that
nation. Grachev stated that the Black Sea Fleet should be under
the command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces CinC and that it "is
not Ukrainian, not Russian, and does not belong to any other
state."
Another draft agreement on the structure and functions of
the CIS High Command of Forces was not initialed. Despite the
lack of agreement in May, Shaposhnikov told his audience that the
CIS High Command of Forces will include rapid operational re-
sponse to local conflicts along the borders of the former union,
but not inside them. All draft agreements are to be finalized at
the next Council of CIS Defense Ministers meeting on July 3, 1992
one day before the CIS summit in Moscow. Not present at the May
meeting were the ministers of defense from Azerbaijan and Molda-
va. Georgia sent an observer.
At the end of May, 1992, a four-day conference was held at
the Academy of the General Staff on the "Military Security of
Russia." Reports of the discussions at that conference seemed
to indicate that the evolving Russian military would be "made up
of troops and forces on permanent readiness capable of acting
effectively in local conflicts, rapid reaction forces, and stra-
tegic reserves. Grachev told the conference that a concept for
the organizational development of the Russian armed forces would
be submitted to Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin by September
1, 1992.
Grachev has also provided additional details about the
internal organization of the Russian military headquarters. He
stated that the semicivilian semimilitary Ministry of Defense
would assume political-administrative functions while the mili-
tary general staff would tackle operational-strategic planning
and lead the troops. 00 The Ministry of Defense would be reor-
ganized with one deputy heading the headquarters and being "re-
sponsible for the planning and management of the forces, as well
as for the mobilization and intelligence operations." 101 The
other deputy would "direct the ministries activities in conver-
sion, international cooperation, armament, and technical develop-
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ment." A third deputy might be created with responsibility for
personnel and social security matters of the servicemen, the
military budget, finances and strategic research." A fourth
"deputy" might be the chief of the General Staff.
Various numbers for the Ukrainian armed forces have been
bandied about, the latest (March 1992) being a reduction from the
\\ million personnel currently stationed there to around 200,000-
300,000 in all. Belarus has also had numerous figures men-
tioned with the latest /May 1992) being a reduction from 200,000
to roughly 90-95, 000. 103 Other republics have indicated they
will build as follows: Georgia, roughly 20,000 men; 104 Kazakh-
stan, around 50,000 men; 105 Turkmenistan, some 40,000 men; 106
Uzbekistan, roughly 25-30, 000. 107
There are some obvious guestions regarding compliance with
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty due to the trans-
fer of Committee on State Security (KGB) Forces to the USSR armed
forces and the creation of republic armies. The former Soviet
Union is moving toward re-positioning all ground forces within
its borders, a military doctrine and strategy that includes
absorbing the first blow from an adversary, then having the
capability to repel the invasion to the border but not cross and
continue the counterof fensive in enemy territory. This was an
idea proposed first in 1988 by now-Deputy Defense Minister Andrey
A. Kokoshin and General-Major Valentin Veniaminovich Larionov, a
military professor at the General Staff Academy. Their proposal
was considered so outlandish at the time, that it was not trans-
lated by either the U.S. government's FBIS or JPRS. 108
Notes
(1) Sergey Kortunov, First Secretary USSR Minister of Foreign
Affairs, "Stability in the Nuclear World," Moscow International
Affairs in English, no. 3 (March 1990) : 6; Vladimir Andreyevich
Manzhola, "France's 'Minimum Deterrence' Nuclear Strategy,"
Moscow Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya in Rus-
sian, no. 8 (August 1990): 105-112 ( JPRS-UWE-90-012 , October 29,
1990, pp. 30-37) ; and Andrey Kortunov, "World View - Russia and
De Gaulle," Moscow Moscow News in English, no. 36, September 16-
23, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-194, October 5, 1990, p. 74).
(2) Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, A. A. Vasilyev, and Andrey
Afanasyevich Kokoshin, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability,"
Moscow SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya in Russian, no. 9
(September 1987): 3-13 (JPRS-USA-88-003 , March 10, 1988, p. 4)
;
Aleksey G. Arbatov, "On Parity and Reasonable Sufficiency,"
Moscow Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn in Russian, no. 9 (September 1988)
:
80-92 (FBIS-SOV-88-203- Annex, October 20, 1988, p. 7), reprinted
in Moscow International Affairs in English, October 1988, p. 83;
and Aleksey G. Arbatov, "Defense Sufficiency and Security,"
Moscow Novoye v Zhizni, Nauke, Tekhnike: Seriya "Mezhdunarodnaya"
in Russian, no. 4, 1990, pp. 1-64 (JPRS-UMA-90-008-L, June 20,
1990, p. 17)
.
(3) Colonel V. Strebkov, "From the Standpoint of the New Think-
85
ing: Military Parity Yesterday and Today," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda
in Russian, January 3, 1989, 1st ed., p. 3 (JPRS-UMA-89-002
,
January 26, 1989, p. 25); Lev Semenovich Semeyko, "Sensible
Sufficiency Is a Way to Reliable Peace," Moscow Kommunist in
Russian, no. 7 (May 1989): 112-121 (JPRS-UKO-89-013 , July 24,
1989, pp. 80-81); and Vladimir Chernyshev report, Moscow TASS in
English, 1152 GMT, November 30, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-232 , December
3, 1990, p. 3)
.
(4) Igor Malashenko, "Parity Reassessed," Moscow New Times in
English, no. 47, November 30, 1987, p. 9; Colonel Yevgeny Klim-
chuk, "When Was Parity Established," Moscow Argumenty I Fakty in
Russian, no. 13, April 1-7, 1989, p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-89-067, April
10, 1989, p. 5); Colonels Vladimir Dvorkhin and Valeriy Torbin,
"On Real Sufficiency of Defense - Military Specialists' Point of
View," Moscow Moscow News in English, no. 26, June 25, 1989, p. 6
(FBIS-SOV-89-126, July 3, 1989, p. 105); Radomir Bogdanov and
Andrey Kortunov, "On the Balance of Power," Moscow International
Affairs in English, August 1989, pp. 3-13 (also found in
JPRS-UMA-89-024, October 12, 1989, pp. 37-44); V. Dmitriyev and
Colonel V. Strebkov, "Outdated Concept," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda
in Russian, April 10, 1990, 1st ed.
,
p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-90-074 , April
17, 1990, p. 2); Sergey Yurakov interview with Marshal of the
Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, then-chief of the USSR
Armed Forces General Staff, and academician Georgiy A. Arbatov,
director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, broadcast on the
"Serving the Fatherland" program, Moscow Television Service in
Russian, 2130 GMT, July 21, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-145 , July 27, 1990,
p. 63) ; and Tsutomu Saito interview with Valentin Falin, Secre-
tary and Head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central
Committee's International Department, "A Discourse on the World,"
Tokyo Sankei Shimbun in Japanese, August 18, 1990, morning ed.
,
p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-170-A, August 31, 1990, p. 5)
.
(5) Army General Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR Minister of
Defense, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," London RUSI [Royal United
Services Institute for Defence Studies] Journal in English, 134,
no. 4 (Winter 1989) : 2.
(6) Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Kozlov commentary reporting decla-
ration of General-Colonel Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief
of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, on Moscow's Radio
Moscow World Service in English, 2100 GMT, November 9, 1991
(FBIS-SOV-91-220, November 14, 1991, p. 1).
(7) Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, then-chief of USSR
Armed Forces General Staff, "They Need Not Be Afraid of Us,"
Moscow Trud in Russian, October 1, 1991, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-91-191,
October 2, 1991, pp. 52-54).
(8) General-Major G.V. Kirilenko and Lieutenant Colonel D.V.
Trenin, "Reflections on a Draft Military Doctrine," Moscow Voyen-
naya Mysl in Russian, no. 10 (October 1991) : 11-18 (JPRS-UMT-92-
004-L, February 11, 1992, p. 9).
(9) Aleksey G. Arbatov, "Finale is Important, Not START [Strate-
86
gic Arms Reduction Talks]," Moscow New Times in English, no. 45,
November 12-18, 1991, pp. 18-20 (FBIS-SOV-91-235 , December 6,
1991, pp. 1-3).
(10) Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev "Diplomatic Panorama"
interview reported by Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1715 GMT,
November 15, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-222 , November 18, 1991, p. 2);
Tsushin Katsumi (Japanese Agency KYODO) interview with Soviet
President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev reported by Moscow TASS
International Service in Russian, 1416 GMT, November 27, 1991
(FBIS-SOV-91-231, December 2, 1991, p. 16).
(11) David Dimbleby interview with Russian President Boris
Nikolayevich Yeltsin on the "News Night" Program, broadcast on
London BBC Television Network in English, 2230 GMT, January 29,
1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-020, January 30, 1992, p. 22).
(12) Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power—1990, 9th ed.




(13) The White House, National Security Strategy of the United
States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August
1991), p. 26.
(14) Sergey Kuznetsov reports carried by Moscow TASS Interna-
tional Service in Russian, 0125 and 0753 GMT, January 26, 1992
(FBIS-SOV-92-017, January 27, 1992, p. 1).
(15) Summary of written interview with Russian Foreign Minister
Andrey Kozyrev carried in Tokyo Yomiuri Shimbun in Japanese,
March 15, 1992, morning ed.
,
p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-052-A, March 17,
1992, p. 7).
(16) N. Zhelnorova interview with Ukrainian President Leonid
Makarovich Kravchuk, "I Do Not Want to Overpower Russia," Moscow
Argru/nenty I Fakty in Russian, no. 8 (February 1992) : 1, 3-4
(FBIS-SOV-92-041, March 2, 1992, p. 54); Viktor Litovkin, "Three
Days on the Typhoon — Part I," Moscow Izvestiya in Russian,
February 29, 1992, morning ed.
,
p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-048 , March 11,
1992, pp. 3-4)
.
(17) Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin speech at the United
Nations Security Council, "Ready to Continue Partnership," print-
ed in Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian, February 3, 1992, 1st
ed., pp. 1, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-022, February 3, 1992, p. 20).
(18) Aleksey G. Arbatov, "The Mysteries of the Nuclear Button,"
Moscow New Times in English, no. 4 (January 1992): 20-23 (FBIS-
SOV-92-043, March 4, 1992, pp. 2-6; and JPRS-UMA-92-009 , March
11, 1992, pp. 7-10)
.
(19) Aleksey G. Arbatov, "Defense Sufficiency and Security,"
Moscow Novoye v Zhizni, Nauke, Tekhnike: Seriya "Mezhdunarodnaya"




(20) General-Major V. Ivanov, senior lecturer at the General
Staff Academy of the USSR, "Radical Renewal or 'Cosmetic
Repair'?" Moscow Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil in Russian, no. 15
(August 1990): 15-20 (FBIS-SOV-90-180-S, September 17, 1990, pp.
40-44 or JPRS-UMA-91-022, August 21, 1991, pp. 14-17).
(21) General-Colonel Anatoliy Nikolayevich Kleymenov, Deputy
Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, "On Certain Meth-
odological Approaches to Solving Problems of War and Peace (Mili-
tary-Political Aspect)," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, no. 9
(September 1990): 11-17 (JPRS-UMT-90-009-L, November 21, 1990, p.
9).
(22) Interview with Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev,
Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, "Military Reform:
Reality and Prospects," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, Novem-
ber 20, 1990, 1st ed., p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-90-225, November 21, 1990,
pp. 49-54).
(23) Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy T. Yazov, then-USSR
Minister of Defense, "USSR Ministry of Defense Draft Military
Reform Concept," Moscow Pravitelstvennyy Vestnik in Russian, no.
48 (November 1990): 5-10 (FBIS-SOV-90-239 , December 12, 1990, pp.
62-75; or JPRS-UMA-9 0-02 8 , December 17, 1990, pp. 52-70); or as
published in Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, special ed.
,
signed to press November 30, 1990, pp. 3-23 ( JPRS-UMT-91-001-L,
January 3, 1991, pp. 1-14).
(24) Army General Vladimir N. Lobov, then-chief of Staff of the
Warsaw Pact, "Ways of Realizing the Concept of Sufficiency for
Defense," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, no. 2 (February
1991): 13-19 (JPRS-UMT-91-006-L, July 18, 1991, pp. 6-10).
(25) Sergey M. Rogov, deputy director of the U.S.A. and Canada
Institute, "What Kind of Military Reform?" Moscow Kommunist in
Russian, no. 6 (April 1991): 88-99 (FBIS-SOV-91-137-A, July 17,
1991, pp. 5-13).
(26) "What People Say and Write," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in
Russian, August 29, 1991, single ed., p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-169,
August 30, 1991, p. 96).
(27) Pavel Felgengauer interview with General Vladimir N. Lobov,
then-chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, "The
New Chief of the Soviet General Staff: General Lobov on the
Structure of Armed Forces During the Transition Stage," Moscow
Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, September 3, 1991, pp. 1-2 (FBIS-
SOV-91-184, September 23, 1991, p. 45).
(28) Army General Vladimir N. Lobov, then-chief of USSR Armed
Forces General Staff, "They Need Not Be Afraid of Us," Moscow
Trud in Russian, October 1, 1991, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-91-191, October
2, 1991, pp. 52-54)
.
(29) Vladimir Smelov report of statements by General-Colonel
Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of
88
the USSR Armed Forces, before the Vienna seminar on military
doctrine with representatives from 38 members of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) , Moscow TASS Inter-
national Service in Russian, 1134 GMT, October 10, 1991
(FBIS-SOV-91-198, October 11, 1991, p. 1).
(30) Report of comments by General-Colonel Frants Markovskiy,
first deputy head of a main directorate of the General Staff of
the USSR Armed Forces before the Vienna seminar on military
doctrine with representatives from 38 members of the CSCE, Moscow
TASS International Service in Russian, 1555 GMT, October 11, 1991
(FBIS-SOV-91-200, October 16, 1991, p. 45).
(31) V. Nazarenko report of comments by General-Colonel Frants
Markovskiy, first deputy head of a main directorate of the Gener-
al Staff of the USSR Armed Forces before the Vienna seminar on
military doctrine with representatives from 38 members of the
CSCE, "Report From Seminar in Vienna: The Armed Forces of the
Renewed Union," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, October 17,
1991, 1st ed., p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-202, October 18, 1991, p. 34).
(32) Major A. Yegorov interview with General Vladimir N. Lobov,
then-chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, "Poli-
cy, Doctrine, and Strategy in a Changing World: Army General
Vladimir Lobov on Military Reform," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in
Russian, October 23, 1991, 1st ed., pp. 1-2 (FBIS-SOV-91-208
,
October 28, 1991, p. 45).
(33) Army General Vladimir N. Lobov, then-chief of the USSR
General Staff, "Military Force Generation [Stroitelstvo] : On a
New Foundation," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, no. 10 (Octob-
er 1991): 2-10 (JPRS-UMT-92-004-L, February 11, 1992, p. 4).
(34) Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, then-
USSR Minister of Defense, November 5, 1991 news conference broad-
cast on Moscow Ail-Union Radio, First Program Radio-1 Network in
Russian, 1700 GMT; also reported by TASS correspondent Andrey
Naryshkin in Moscow TASS International Service at 1732 GMT,
November 5, 1991; and by Moscow INTERFAX in English at 1743 GMT,
November 5, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-215, November 6, 1991, pp. 35-36);
also reported by Major A. Yegorov in "USSR State Council Say
'Yes' to Unified Armed Forces, Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian,
November 7, 1991, 1st ed., p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-217 , November 8,
1991, p. 36) . The draft law enacting the Council was enacted on
November 14, 1991 and published in Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in
Russian, November 21, 1991, 1st ed.
,
p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-226,
November 22 1991, pp. 37-38).
(35) Interview with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov
USSR Defense Minister broadcast on Radio Moscow World Service in
English, 2010 GMT, November 15, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-222 , November
18, 1991, p. 36)
.
(36) Radio Moscow World Service in English, 1300 GMT, November
29, 1991 (["Defense Ministers Council to be Formed"] FBIS-SOV-91-
231, December 2, 1991, p. 32).
89
(37) Synopsis of draft treaty provided by Moscow INTERFAX in
English, 1140 GMT, November 15, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-221, November
15, 1991, p. 31).
(38) "New Wave" Program carried on Moscow All-Union Radio First
Program Radio-1 Network in Russian, 2000 GMT, November 30, 1991
(["Draft Treaty on Collective Security Compiled"] FBIS-SOV-91-
231, December 2, 1991, p. 12).
(39) Major A. Dolinin interview, "Army General Yu. [ri Pavlovich]
Maksimov: Motherland's Missile Shield Should Preserve Reliabili-
ty," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, November 16, 1991, p. 3
(FBIS-SOV-91-223, November 19, 1991, p. 40).
(40) Nikolay Panyukov, "New Branch of Country's Armed Forces
Created," Moscow Rabochaya Tribuna in Russian, November 19, 1991,
p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-91-223, November 19, 1991, pp. 38-39); Tatyana
Chemodanova report broadcast on Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian, 1450 GMT, November 19, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-224
,
November 20, 1991, p. 40) ; Yevgeny Nikitin report carried by
Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1537 GMT, November
22, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-228, November 26, 1991, p. 41); Army Gener-
al Vladimir N. Lobov, Chief of the General Staff, "The Renewed
Union and Problems of Defense: Military Reform—Historical Pre-
conditions and Basic Directions," Moscow Voyenno-Istoricheskiy
Zhurnal in Russian, no. 11 (November 1991) : 2-10 (JPRS-UMA-92-
001L, March 16, 1992, p. 7); Viktor Litovkin interview, "Army
General Yu. [riy P.] Maksimov: 'Our Nuclear Weapons are Under USSR
Presidential Control," Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, December 11,
1991, Union ed.
,
p. 7 (FBIS-SOV-91-238 , December 11, 1991, p.
30) .
(41) Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev interview with General-
Lieutenant Yuriy D. Bukreyev, Chief of the USSR Ground Forces
Main Staff, "First Interview in New Post: I Favor 'Ground Defense
Forces'," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, November 28, 1991, 1st ed.
,
p.
2 (FBIS-SOV-91-232, December 3, 1991, p. 48); also reported by
Moscow TASS in English, 2230 GMT, November 27, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-
230, November 29, 1991, p. 47).
(42) Army General Vladimir N. Lobov, then-chief of the USSR
General Staff, "The Renewed Union and Problems of Defense: Mili-
tary Reform—Historical Preconditions and Basic Directions,"
Moscow Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal in Russian, no. 11 (November
1991): 2-10 (JPRS-UMA-92-001L, March 16, 1992, pp. 2-8).
(43) A. Krayniy, "A Clash of the Titans? There is a New Master in
the Chief of the General Staff's Office," Moscow Komsomolskaya
Pravda in Russian, December 10, 1991, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-91-240,
December 13, 1991, p. 27); Andrey Naryshkin report carried by
Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1806 GMT, December
13, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-241, p. 29); Pavel Felgengauer interview,
"How the Chief of the General Staff was Removed; General Lobov:
'I Was Relieved from my Position Because of Articles in Newspa-
pers'," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, December 21, 1991,
p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-001, January 2, 1992, p. 33).
90
(44) Yuriy Teplyakov, "Generals are Leaving: Why? On Cadre Chang-
es in the General Staff," Moscow Moskovskiye Novosti in Russian,
no. 50, December 15, 1991, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-91-247 , December 24,
1991, p. 32; also found in JPRS-UMA-92-008 , March 4, 1992, pp.
11-12) ; Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladykin, "Army Beyond Political
Games, Marshal of Aviation Ye. [vgeney I.] Shaposhnikov Said at
Meeting with Journalists," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian,
December 17, 1991, 1st ed.
,
p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-242 , December 17,
1991, p. 33; also found in JPRS-UMA-92-001, January 10, 1992, pp.
23-24) .
(45) "Decree of the President of the USSR Concerning the Chief
of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces," Moscow Krasnaya
Zvezda in Russian, December 10, 1991, p. 1 (JPRS-UMA-92-001,
January 10, 1992, p. 24).
(46) Speech by President Boris N. Yeltsin at the December 12,
1991 Russian Supreme Soviet Session in Moscow carried live by
Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian, 0804 GMT, December
12, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-239, December 12, 1991, p. 40).
(47) Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, USSR Defense
Minister, news conference carried by Moscow Central Television
First Program Network in Russian, 1936, December 13, 1991 (FBIS-
SOV-91-241, December 16, 1991, p. 30).
(48) Remarks by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin at news
conference following talks with U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker broadcast on Moscow Ail-Union Radio Mayak Network in Rus-
sian, 1730 GMT, December 16, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-242, December 17,
1991, p. 39)
.
(49) News conference by CIS heads of State at Alma-Ata, broad-
cast on Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Rus-
sian, 1300 GMT, December 21, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-246, December 23,
1991, pp. 33, 38)
.
(50) "We Have a Commonwealth of Presidents. Will We Have a
Commonwealth of Peoples? Protocol of the Conference of Heads of
Independent States," Moscow Pravda in Russian, December 23, 1991,
p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-91-246, December 23, 1991, p. 31).
(51) Viktor Litovkin, "Army is Prepared to Obey Presidents:
Presidents are Trying to Agree Among Themselves," Moscow Izves-
tiya in Russian, December 31, 1991, p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-001, Janu-
ary 2, 1992, pp. 30-31); Pavel Felgengauer, "How to Divide the
Army--Honestly or Justly?: The Soviet Army is Being Transformed
into the Allied Armed Forces of the Commonwealth," Moscow Nezavi-
simaya Gazeta in Russian, December 31, 1991, pp. 1-2
(FBIS-SOV-92-009, January 14, 1992, pp. 9-13; or JPRS-UMA-92-002
,
January 16, 1992, pp. 41-48).
(52) "An Agreement Between the Member States of the Commonwealth
of Independent States on Strategic Forces," Moscow TASS Interna-
tional Service in Russian, 0925 GMT, December 31, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-
91-251, December 31, 1991, pp. 17-18); "Additions and Amendments
91
by Some Republics to the Agreed Text of the Agreement on Defense
Matters," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, January 3, 1992,
p. 2 (JPRS-UMA-92-004, February 6, 1992, pp. 13-14).
(53) Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Gorenko, "Ministry of Defense of
Ukraine—CIS Joint Armed Forces: An Attempt to Determine Posi-
tions on Strategic Forces," Kiev Narodnaya Armiya in Russian,
April 8, 1992, pp. 2-3 ( JPRS-UMA-92-016, May 6, 1992, pp. 11-12);
and Colonels M. Malygin and A. Polyakov, "Meeting Held, No Agree-
ment Reached," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, April 8, 1992,
p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-069, April 9, 1992, pp. 10-11).
(54) "Agreement Among the Member States of the Commonwealth of
Independent States on the Status of the Strategic Forces," re-
ported by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 0828 GMT,
February 15, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-032, February 18, 1992, pp. 18-
21).
(55) "Decision of Commonwealth of Independent States Council of
Heads of State on Appointment of Commander in Chief of Joint
Armed Forces of the Commonwealth," Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian, 0952 GMT, February 15, 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-032,
February 18, 1992, p. 22).
(56) "Agreement Between the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan,
the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenia,
and the Republic of Uzbekistan on General Purpose Forces for the
Transition Period," reported by Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian, 1206 GMT, February 18, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-032, Febru-
ary 18, 1992, p. 21); and in Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Rus-
sian, February 21, 1992, p. 3 ( JPRS-UMA-92-008, March 4, 1992, p.
12) .
(57) Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, "The Documents are Being
Drawn Up in Moscow, But What will be Said in Kiev is Important,
Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, March 11, 1992, p. 1
(FBIS-SOV-92-048, March 11, 1992, pp. 11-13); "Agreement on the
Powers of the Highest Bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent
States on Questions of Defense," reported by Moscow TASS Interna-
tional Service in Russian, 1855 GMT, March 23, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-
057, March 24, 1992, pp. 21-23).
(58) "Agreement on the Joint Armed Forces for the Transitional
Period," reported by Moscow TASS International Service in Rus-
sian, 1906 GMT, March 23, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-057 , March 24, 1992,
p. 23) .
(59) Viktor Demidenko report in Moscow TASS in English, 1509
GMT, March 20, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-056, March 23, 1992, p. 12).
(60) "CIS Agreement on Status of General Purpose Forces," re-
ported by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1921 GMT,
March 23, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-058, March 25, 1992, pp. 12-15).
(61) "Decision on Appointment of Chief of General Staff and
92
Commander of Strategic Forces of the Joint Armed Forces of the
Commonwealth," Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1920
GMT, March 23, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-057 , March 24, 1992, p. 25).
(62) "Decision on Appointment of Commander of Commonwealth Joint
Armed Forces General Purpose Forces," Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian, 1743 GMT, March 23, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-057,
March 24, 1992, p. 16)
.
(63) Vadam Birkin and Andrey Naryshnikov report of news confer-
ence with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, CinC of
the CIS Joint Armed Forces, carried by Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian, 1529 GMT, March 23, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-058
,
March 25, 1992, p. 19)
(64) Viktor Litovkin interview with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny
I. Shaposhnikov, CinC of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, "Commander
in Chief Satisfied With Work Done With Presidents," Moscow Jzves-
tiya in Russian, March 25, 1992, morning ed.
,
p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-
058, March 25, 1992, p. 18).
(65) Lieutenant Colonel I. Sergeyev interview with General-
Colonel Boris Ye. Pyankov, "The Emergency Supplies are not for
the Moment Exhausted. . .Will the Independent States be Able to
Feed Their Armies," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, March 7,
1992, pp. 1, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-049, March 12, 1992, pp. 13-14);
Pavel Felgengauer interview with General-Colonel Leonid Vasilye-
vich Kuznetsov, deputy chief of the General Staff and chief of
the Main Operations Directorate, "Today President Yeltsin is to
Sign Decree on Formation of Russian Army and Navy: Two Members of
State Commission on Formation of Russian Army Speak of Future of
Republic's Armed Forces," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian,
May 7, 1992, pp. 1-2 (FBIS-SOV-92-090, May 8, 1992, p. 32).
(66) Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin decree, "On the Ministry
of Defense and Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," reported
by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1743 GMT, March
16, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-052, March 17, 1992, p. 31).
(67) Speech by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin to the Sixth
Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation at the
Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, live broadcast by Moscow Russian
Television Network in Russian, 0633 GMT, April 7, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-
92-068-S, April 8, 1992, p. 27).
(68) Nikolay Burbyga report of briefing with General-Lieutenant
Valeriy Manilov, chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Information
Directorate, "Rocket Forces Remain Under CIS Auspices," Moscow
Izvestiya in Russian, May 18, 1992, morning ed. , p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-
92-097, May 19, 1992, p. 24).
(69) "Decree of Russian Federation President on the Creation of
Russian Federation Armed Forces [dated May 7, 1992]," Moscow
Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian, May 9, 1992, 1st ed. , p. 1 (FBIS-
SOV-92-091, May 11, 1992, pp. 27-28).
93
(70) "Russian Federation Presidential Decree on the Russian
Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense [dated April 3,
1992]," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, April 7, 1992, 1st
ed., p. 1 (JPRS-UMA-92-016, May 6, 1992, p. 1).
(71) Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian, 1900 GMT, May 18,
1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-097, May 19, 1992, p. 18).
(72) James R. Holbrook, David R. Beachley, and Daniel C. Beck,
"Acting Chief of Russian General Staff Identified," citing Moscow
Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, May 27, 1992 (FSRC News Brief, A92-
036/UL, June 8, 1992, p. 1).
(73) D. Muratov, Yu. Sorokin, V. Fronin interview with Boris N.
Yeltsin, Russian President, on May 23, 1992, "Boris Yeltsin: I Am
Not Hiding the Difficulties and I Want the People to Understand
This," Moscow Komsomolskaya Pravda in Russian, May 27, 1992, p. 2
(FBIS-SOV-92-103, May 28, 1992, p. 32).
(74) Ivan Yelistratov report including commentary by General-
Lieutenant V. Barynkin, representative of the CIS Joint Armed
Forces General Staff, "Russia Will Have Its Own Strategic
Forces," Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, May 14, 1992, morning ed.
,
pp. 1, 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-096, May 18, 1992, p. 37). On the other
hand, a subsequent report referred to the Strategic Deterrent
Forces (SDF) as if they still existed. See: Major S. Knyazkov,
"Black Sea Fleet Not Part of Strategic Forces: Defense Minister's
Council Awaits Solution to This Issue From Russia and Ukraine,"
Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, May 28, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-103,
May 28, 1992, p. 9)
.
(75) Captain 2nd Rank O. Odnokolenko interview with Aleksandr
Kotenkov, deputy leader of the Russian president's State-Law
Administration, "We Should Create Ministry of Military Reform,"
Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, April 14, 1992, p. 2
(FBIS-SOV-92-074, April 16, 1992, p. 33); Ivan Yelistratov report
including commentary by General-Lieutenant V. Barynkin, represen-
tative of the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, "Russia Will
Have Its Own Strategic Forces," Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, May
14, 1992, morning ed.
, pp. 1, 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-096, May 18, 1992,
p. 37).
(76) "Treaty on Collective Security," Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta
in Russian, May 23, 1992, 1st ed., p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-101, May 26,
1992, pp. 8-9)
.
(77) Previous press reports indicate that Turkmenistan also
signed the Tashkent agreement and not Kyrgyzstan. See reports of
a post-summit press conference with various republic leaders:
Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1629 GMT, May 15, 1992 and Moscow
ITAR-TASS in English, 1701 GMT, May 15, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-099,
May 21, 1992, pp. 19, 22).
(78) Interview with General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev,
Russian Defense Minister, Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1429 GMT,
May 19, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-098 , May 20, 1992, p. 27).
94
(79) "Novosti" newscast report of interview with General-Colonel
Pavel S. Grachev, Russian Defense Minister, Moscow Teleradiokom-
paniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian,
1700 GMT, May 19, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-098 , May 20, 1992, p. 27);
Report of news briefing by General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev,
Russian Defense Minister on May 21, 1992, Moscow INTERFAX in
English, May 22, 1992 ([Grachev Says 7th Army to Withdraw From
Armenia] FBIS-SOV-92-103 , May 28, 1992, p. 24).
(80) A. Krayniy interview with General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev,
Russian Defense Minister, "People are not Potatoes and I will not
Transplant Them Out in the Open Field. Exclusive Interview with
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev," Moscow Komsomolskaya
Pravda in Russian, May 20, 1992, p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-101, May 26,
1992, p. 26)
.
(81) Igor Zhukov, "Russia and Turkmenistan Will Have One Army
for the Two of Them," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, May
21, 1992, p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-104, May 29, 1992, pp. 63-65); Speech
by Saparmurad Niyazov, President of Turkmenistan, reported by
Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1620 GMT, May 23, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-
102, May 27, 1992, p. 55); Boris Grishchenko, et. al., "Presiden-
tial Bulletin," Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1749 GMT, May 27,
1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-103, May 28, 1992, pp. 67-68); Moscow INTERFAX
in English, 1933 GMT, June 3, 1992 and Igor Zhukov, Turkmenistan
Unwilling to Surrender Army to Russia: Latest Round of Turkmen-
Russian Military Talks Begins in Ashkhabad 8 June," Moscow Neza-
visimaya Gazeta in Russian, June 5, 1992, p. 1 ([Turkmenistan
Disagrees on Status of Forces] and [More on "Disagreements"]
FBIS-SOV-92-109, June 5, 1992, pp. 21-22).
(82) Speeches by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin and Kazakh
President Nursultan A. Nazarbayev at the Kremlin, Moscow Mayak
Radio Network in Russian, 1520 GMT, May 25, 1992; and Ivan Ivanov
report, Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, 1645 GMT, May 25, 1992
(FBIS-SOV-92-101, May 26, 1992, p. 14).
(83) Krasnaya Zvezda report of interview with General-Colonel
Pavel Kozlovskiy, Belarus Minister of Defense, by Moscow ITAR-
TASS in English, 1241 GMT, May 30, 1992, (FBIS-SOV-92-105, June
1, 1992, p. 44)
.
(84) Aleksandr Knyazev report broadcast on Moscow Radio Rossii
Network in Russian, 1900 GMT, May 30, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-105, June
1, 1992, p. 53); Colonel A. Ladin, "Kyrgyzstan' s Position in
Military Building Field Remains Unchanged: But Troops on Repub-
lic's Territory Have Been Taken Under its Jurisdiction," Moscow
Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, June 2, 1992, p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-108
,
June 4, 1992, p. 89)
.
(85) Tatyana Chemodnova report of interview with General-Colonel
Pavel S. Grachev, Russian Defense Minister, Moscow Mayak Radio
Network in Russian, 1353 GMT, May 19, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-098, May
20, 1992, p. 27)
.
(86) "Officers to be Appointed on Competitive Basis," report of
95
interview with General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev, Russian Defense
Minister, Moscow Kuranty in Russian, May 20, 1992, p. 1
(FBIS-SOV-92-099, May 21, 1992, p. 54).
(87) Colonel O. Falichev report of May 23, 1992 interview with
General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev, Russian Defense Minister,
"Building Russian Army is Task for all the People. In the Opin-
ion of Army General P. Grachev, Russian Federation Defense Min-
ister, it Will be Resolved in Stages, on the Basis of New Ap-
proaches to the Creation of Force Groupings and the Ideology of
Armed Warfare," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, May 26, 1992,
p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-101, May 26, 1992, p. 25).
(88) Sergey Ovsiyenko interview with General-Colonel Pavel S.
Grachev, Russian Defense Minister, "The Army: Overcoming Arrhyth-
mia," Moscow Rossiyskiye Vesti in Russian, May 29, 1992, pp. 1, 2
(FBIS-SOV-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 25).
(89) A. Peslyak interview with Andrey A. Kokoshin, First Deputy
Minister of Defense, Moscow Russian Television Network in Rus-
sian, 1840 GMT, May 31, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-105, June 1, 1992, p.
27) .
(90) Colonel O. Falichev report of May 23, 1992 interview with
General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev, Russian Defense Minister,
"Building Russian Army is Task for all the People. In the Opin-
ion of Army General P. Grachev, Russian Federation Defense Min-
ister, it Will be Resolved in Stages, on the Basis of New Ap-
proaches to the Creation of Force Groupings and the Ideology of
Armed Warfare," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, May 26, 1992,
p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-101, May 26, 1992, p. 25).
(91) Captain 2nd Rank 0. Odnokolenko interview with Ruslan
Khasbulatov, Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet,
"The Army Dislikes Being Flirted With, and we Must Bear this in
Mind," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, May 19, 1992, pp. 1, 2
(FBIS-SOV-92-098, May 20, 1992, pp. 28-30).
(92) Yuliya Khaytina interview with General-Colonel Pavel S.
Grachev, Russian Defense Minister, "'The Army is not a Prison,'
Pavel Grachev, 'Overseer' of the Russian Armed Forces, Thinks,"
Moscow Moskovskiy Komsomolets in Russian, May 20, 1992, p. 2
(FBIS-SOV-92-099, May 21, 1992, p. 53).
(93) Natalya Gorodetskaya report of press conference with Mar-
shal of Aviation Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, CinC of the Joint Armed
Forces, "CIS Commander in Chief Loses Premises, But is Convinced
that Joint Armed Forces Will Survive," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta
in Russian, May 21, 1992, p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-100, May 22, 1992, p.
7).
(94) Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, CinC of the
CIS Joint Armed Forces, at a press conference, carried by Radio
Moscow World Service in English, 2010 GMT, May 26, 1992; and
Andrey Naryshkin report, Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Rus-
sian, 1621 GMT, May 26, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-102 , May 27, 1992, pp.
96
7, 8); Major S. Knyazkov, "Black Sea Fleet Not Part of Strategic
Forces: Defense Minister's Council Awaits Solution to This Issue
From Russia and Ukraine," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, May
28, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-103, May 28, 1992, p. 9).
(95) Viktor Litovkin, "Russia and Ukraine Continue Dispute
Because of the Nuclear Button," Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, May
28, 1992, morning ed.
,
p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-104 , May 29, 1992, p.
2); Major S. Knyazkov, "Black Sea Fleet Not Part of Strategic
Forces: Defense Minister's Council Awaits Solution to This Issue
From Russia and Ukraine," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, May
28, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-103, May 28, 1992, p. 9).
(96) Sergey Ovsiyenko interview with General-Colonel Pavel S.
Grachev, Russian Defense Minister, "The Army: Overcoming Arrhyth-
mia," Moscow Rossiyskiye Vesti in Russian, May 29, 1992, pp. 1, 2
(FBIS-SOV-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 25).
(97) "Novosti" newscast broadcast by Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian, 1100 and
1700 GMT, May 26, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-102 , May 27, 1992, pp. 7, 8).
(98) Mikhail Shevtsov report by Moscow ITAR-TASS in English,
1435 GMT, May 30, 1992; and Tatyana Chemodanova report broadcast
by Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian, 1500 GMT, May
30, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 26).
(99) Colonel G. Miranovich, "Russia's Armed Forces Today and
Tomorrow," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, June 2, 1992, pp.
1, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-108, June 4, 1992, p. 50).
(100) "Officers to be Appointed on Competitive Basis," report
of interview with General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev, Russian
Defense Minister, Moscow Kuranty in Russian, May 20, 1992, p. 1
(FBIS-SOV-92-099, May 21, 1992, p. 53).
(101) Report of address by General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev,
Russian Defense Minister, at the "Military Security of Russia"
conference, Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1342 GMT, May 30, 1992
(FBIS-SOV-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 27); Colonel G. Miranovich
report of General-Colonel Pavel S. Grachev, Acting Russian De-
fense Minister, concluding speech at the "Military Security of
Russia" conference, "Russia's Armed Forces Today and Tomorrow,"
Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, June 2, 1992, pp. 1, 3 (FBIS-
SOV-92-108, June 4, 1992, p. 50).
(102) Maria Graczyk interview with Ukrainian President Leonid M.
Kravchuk "Common Sense," Poznan Wprost in Polish, March 8, 1992,
pp. 13, 14 (FBIS-SOV-92-055, March 20, 1992, p. 69).
(103) Excerpts of Belarussian Supreme Soviet speech by General-
Lieutenant Pavel Kozlovskiy, Belarus Minister of Defense, con-
tained in Anatoliy Ovcherenko report broadcast by Moscow Program-
ma Radio Odin Network in Russian, 1800 GMT, April 23, 1992 (FBIS-
SOV-92-081, April 27, 1992, p. 55); BELTA interview with General-
Lieutenant Pavel Kozlovskiy, Belarus Minister of Defense, report-
97
ed by Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian, 164 GMT, April
22, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-079, April 23, 1992, p. 41); Mikhail Shi-
manskiy interview with General-Lieutenant Pavel Kozlovskiy,
Belarus Minister of Defense, "First Interview by First Defense
Minister of Byelarus," Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, April 24,
1992, morning ed., p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-080- April 24, 1992, p. 2)
;
Igor Sinyakevich report of Belarussian Supreme Soviet speech by
General-Lieutenant Pavel Kozlovskiy, Belarus Minister of Defense,
"Nuclear Weapons as Bargaining Chip: West May Give a Great Deal
in Exchange for Security Guarantee," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta
in Russian, April 24, 1992, pp. 1, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-082 , April 28,
1992, p. 2); A. Zhuk interview with General-Lieutenant Pavel
Kozlovskiy, Belarus Minister of Defense, on the "C7tro" program,
broadcast by Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita
Networks in Russian, 1800 GMT, April 27, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-084,
April 30, 1992, p. 51); and Colonels V. Kovalev and P. Chernenko
interview with General-Colonel Pavel Kozlovskiy, Belarus Minister
of Defense, Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, May 30, 1992, p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-
92-106, June 2, 1992, p. 28).
(104) Novosti newscast on Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino
Television First Program Network in Russian, 2000 GMT, April 19,
1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-079, April 23, 1992, p. 53); Anatoliy Gordiyen-
ko, "The Armor is Strong," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian,
April 25, 1992, p. 1 (JPRS-UMA-92-017 , May 13, 1992, p. 33);
Besik Urigashvili, "Georgia is Forming its Own Army," Moscow
Izvestiya in Russian, April 30, 1992, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-085, May
1, 1992, p. 56).
(105) Report of Kazakhstan's defense committee member General-
Lieutenant Erkin Alibekov's comments contained in "Presidential
Bulletin," Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1921 GMT, May 8, 1992
(FBIS-SOV-92-092, May 12, 1992, p. 54).
(106) Radio Moscow Rossii Network in Russian, 0300 GMT, April
30, 1992 ([President Announces Plans for Own Army] FBIS-SOV-92-
084, April 30, 1992, p. 60).
(107) Colonel A. Ladin report of news conference including
statements by Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, "Leaders of
Central Asian States and Kazakhstan Favor Mutual Security
Treaty," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, April 25, 1992, p. 1
(FBIS-SOV-92-081, April 27, 1992, p. 8); Interview with Uzbekis-
tan President Islam Karimov by correspondent Medvedev contained
in "On the Eve of the CIS Chief's Meeting in Tashkent" program
broadcast on Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First
Program Network in Russian, 1904 GMT, May 14, 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-
095, May 15, 1992, p. 7)
.
(108) Andrey A. Kokoshin and General-Major Valentin Veniamino-
vich Larionov, "Counterpositioning Conventional Forces in the
Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability," Moscow Mirovaya Ekono-
mika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya in Russian, no. 6 (June 1988)
:
23-31 (U.S. Army's Soviet Army Studies Office translation, 13
pp.); the reprinting of this article as a chapter, "Confrontation
of Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic
98
Stability," in Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the
European Theater, Vol. 2, The Impact of Political Change on
Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control, Hans Giinter Brauch and
Robert Kennedy, eds. (New York, N.Y.: Crane Russak, 1992), pp.
71-82; "Re-Thinking Victory. An Interview with Andrey Kokoshin,"
deputy director U.S.A. and Canada Institute, Leeds Detente in
English, no. 13, November 17, 1988 (FBIS-SOV-88-238 Annex, Decem-
ber 12, 1988, p. 13); and Larionov presentation at a conference
on "Soviet Military Doctrine in a Changing Era," Old Dominion
University, Norfolk, Virginia, May 25-27, 1989, and in the subse-
quent draft chapter (21 pp. undated) . For some reason, Lario-
nov' s chapter did not appear in the final book of conference
proceedings.
99
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
100
NEW ROLES FOR THE FORMER SOVIET NAVY
We must first look to land-oriented military strategy in
order to properly understand the new Russian Navy roles and
missions. Soviet Navy roles and missions were recast in terms of
the defensive doctrine and strategy. What this meant for the
Soviet Navy was that first-strike damage limitation by nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) was disavowed and
that the fleet was to conduct defensive fleet operations (operat-
sii) in bastions that may even have been closer to the shore than
we once assumed.
The Russian Navy has ended its forward deployments of naval
forces, even those that could have been construed by the West as
being first-strike nuclear forces targeted against the United
States, its overseas bases, or its allies. If the defensive
strategy truly involves the Russian Navy, we should see evidence
in the form of new building programs emphasizing antisubmarine
warfare helicopters, short- or mid-range land-based naval avia-
tion, and small coastal patrol ships instead of long-range Bear F
aircraft, aircraft carriers, and supporting open-ocean battle
groups.
Before a new naval building program could be promulgated,
however, the Soviet military had to first work out its strategic
nuclear force structure and overall military doctrine and strate-
gy. As we have seen, that was just finished by the end of Novem-
ber 1991. In the Gorbachev-era USSR, the future of the Navy was
decided upon after deciding the roles and missions the other
services.
In November 1991, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Nikolayevich
Chernavin, CinC of the Soviet Navy published what appears to be
the long-awaited definitive article providing the Navy's position
on its future. Chernavin' s article was not an announcement of
the fleet's future but merely the Navy's position—after all the
Union itself was up for grabs at the time that this article was
signed to press. With the demise of the Soviet Union, this arti-
cle should be seen as the most optimistic case for a future
Russian Navy and also the worst case threat to the West; i.e. it
is not likely that a Russian fleet would be as strong as that
proposed by Chernavin for the whole USSR. Chernavin 's November
1991 view of the future is also the least likely threat to the
West since it implied resources that are not likely to be provid-
ed to the fleet.
Chernavin 's Soviet Navy of the future was cast in terms of a
defensive military doctrine that did not accept the lack of an
external threat from the U.S. It used mission terms like avert-
ing war, repelling aggression, safeguarding the maritime flanks,
depriving the enemy of the opportunity of conducting offensive
operations, and creating the conditions for the restoration of
peace. Training goals were similarly defensive-sounding.
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The Navy CinC stated that naval strategic nuclear forces
should continue to operate in the future, but in reduced numbers.
Chernavin appeared to announce that no new SSBNs would be built
or put into service in the next ten years. The retention of
existing SSBNs is a critical decision since we should have as-
sumed that future Soviet general purpose forces would continue to
be optimized to protect SSBNs in bastions. This position remains
at the center for the Russian Navy because if it is validated it
provides some justification for Western antisubmarine warfare
submarines, such as the SEAWOLF or CENTURION, designed to hunt
these SSBNs in Russian coastal waters.
Chernavin 's future general purpose forces were given the
principal mission of "...ensuring the physical preservation and
sound functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system under any
condition." Secondary missions were to defend the maritime
frontiers and to inflict "defeat on enemy naval strike groups and
impeding the execution of broad- scale operations [and assist in]
defensive operations in the continental theaters." Chernavin
appeared to announce that the future building programs ruled out
large surface or amphibious ships. Instead, primary attention
was to be given to submarines and aircraft- carrying cruisers.
The civilian rejoinder to Chernavin, by Konstantin Eduardo-
vich Sorokin, was also published in November 1991. It stressed
coastal defense of SSBN bastions with diesel submarines, short-
range land-based aircraft, existing air- capable ships, and mines.
Other forces in reserve would have the mission of operations in
remote ocean areas, protection of own maritime forces, evacuating
citizens, and participation in United Nations actions. Sorokin
specifically ruled out the mission of strategic antisubmarine
warfare against foreign SSBNs. Sorokin' s recommendations may be
viewed as a worst case for the future Russian Navy and a best
case for the West, unless one believes that economic conditions
make even these suggestions optimistic.
With the demise of the USSR, naval building programs once
again came under active discussion. A January 1991 Moscow News
roundtable with senior Navy officers revealed a great deal of
disagreement over a defensive doctrine that would lead to a fleet
of only small coastal combatants. One participant revealed that
recommendations coming from the General Staff's Center for Stra-
tegic Studies was "nothing short of a death sentence to the
Navy .
"
Questions of new naval building programs, however, were
eclipsed by political discussions over who owned the existing
fleet. The world witnessed a public battle over possession of
the former Soviet Navy that had not yet been resolved by the
writing of this book. What seemed likely, by mid-April 1992, was
that the former Soviet Navy would be divided and that the bulk of
the ocean-going fleet would belong to Russia.
In a move to perhaps gain influence with the uniformed armed
forces, Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin's Red Star interview pub-
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lished in mid-March 1992 just prior to his being named a Deputy
Minister of Defense of Russia indicated his support for more than
a coastal defense fleet.
"We need not only coastal defense naval
forces, collaborating with aviation and land
forces, but some proportion of the strategic
missile carriers deployed on combat patrol in
the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk regions.
Submarine forces are also needed to ensure
security of navigation in waters of the
world's oceans which are important for Rus-
sia's national interests."
Kokoshin followed this up with an interview stating that "A
navy is essential for Russia... we have legitimate interests on
the high seas." Following this statement, however, was a care-
fully worded paragraph that discussed the need for maximizing the
military benefit of any new shipbuilding. Preceding the strong
navy statement was one pointing out that when the former USSR
challenged the naval might of the West, it was very burdensome
and dangerous to the Soviet navy.
Despite the lack of significant change in fleet hardware to
date, we must consider that without a capability to consolidate
victory ashore, the Russian Navy that we see today can be con-
strued as a defensive force. Just how offensive is it anyway,
without significant sea-based air power and at sea sustainabili-
ty? The largest naval force ever amassed, the U.S. Navy, is
understood without question to be part of an overall defensive
military strategy. Despite our might at sea, NATO armies were
simply capable of the type of defense that the Russians are
moving towards—repulsing the aggressor and restoring prewar
borders. The military-technical characteristics of war include
its pace; hence there will be a requirement for conducting both
short and long wars, although there may be funding shortfalls for
the more expensive long war. Navies are a hedge against the long
war.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST
The message for the West is that if reorganization plans
like this are implemented and if reductions in military capabili-
ty include strategic nuclear and naval forces in the future, then
former Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's promise to elim-
inate the threat has come true. The changes in strategy envisaged
by President George Bush and by NATO are appropriate under such
an international security environment.
Even if the Russians are found to be cheating on the margin
with regard to the CFE Treaty and other future arms control and
confidence building measures in Europe, we should ask ourselves
if they are in the position to once again mount the old theater
strategic offensive operation. When confronted with that ques-
tion, CFE "cheating" may more correctly be seen as an inability
to provide exact numbers and locations which will be corrected
when requested. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on July 25, 1991, General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army,
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) , stated that two-thirds
of all the Soviet military equipment moved east of the Urals,
which has been described as noncomplying, has been left to
rust— if not already partially or totally destroyed.
Learning how the Russians think and calculate the correla-
tion of forces and means and coefficient of control must be of
the highest priority to our intelligence community. It will then
face the arduous task of explaining the Soviet perceptions to
political and military decision makers who will not be as aware
of the differences and will be tempted to automatically "mirror
image." If the Russians appear to be oriented toward output meas-
ures, dynamic assessments, and other complicated non-Western
measures, we must deal with these measures as the Russians see
them.
CONCLUSIONS
During the Reagan administration, it became commonplace for
the bureaucracy to take its cues from the openly available
speeches of the senior leadership. Policy was announced and made
in a series of public utterances that reflected the trial bal-
loons and approved policy positions of the administration. Such
a system exists in Russia as well.
Commenting on how the General Staff was attempting to con-
duct the organizational development of the Russian armed forces,
the Chief of its Main Operations Directorate openly acknowledged
that they used President Boris N. Yeltsin's speeches as
guidance.
The Soviet Navy has, for some time, been attempting to argue
their case to marshals, generals, and civilian leaders who do not
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have a good appreciation for the value of maritime forces. The
writings of the late Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union
Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov were examples of such attempts.
More recently, we have seen the Soviet Navy correlate the size of
World War II carrier task forces with Soviet frontal aviation air
armies in order to make the comparison and the loss of one or
two German transports, carrying troops and equipment, equivalent
to "carrying out an army-level or even a front-level operation." 5
When the armed forces of the USSR shift reliance to nuclear
weapons, combat elements of the Navy and Air Force suffered.
The shift to a new defensive doctrine, the reduction in the
reliance in nuclear weapons, and the lessons of the Persian Gulf
war are all reasons for the navy to once again make its case
anew. The Persian Gulf war is not simply an episode but rather
the model upon which future doctrine and organizational develop-
ment must be built.
Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated to the West that the
Soviet Union did not view its own security from the sole perspec-
tive of military preparedness. Despite the significant presence
of the U.S. Navy, including its nuclear-weapons capable aircraft
carriers, close to the southern borders the Soviet Navy was not
only not beefed up, but it was withdrawn from the area when
hostilities began.
The Soviet Union, and now Russia, seem to accept that the
U.S. has shifted its strategic focus from a Cold War-oriented
confrontation with the possibility of direct military interaction
to a new regional focus in which the superpowers might not be
engaged. The threat to Russia, in such an international security
environment, is that the U.S. may become involved in states which
directly border Russia or the CIS. Such an involvement cannot be
ignored by Russia since the consequences of armed conflict on her
borders cannot be fully foreseen.
The primary external military planning scenario for Russia,
therefore, is at the operational-strategic-level of warfare in a
contingency response by the West. The political goal of such a
crisis would be to contain this crisis horizontally, vertically,
and over time. If diplomatic and other efforts fail, the Russian
military would be expected to keep the conflict from spreading
across its borders.
Planning need not be conducted for simultaneous nor strate-
gic-level attacks on Russia from all sectors
—
planning can be
different in different TVDs. Planning for defensive military
operations in Europe need not resemble those along Russia's
southern borders. Strategic warning of an operational-level
crisis can be counted on and sequential operations are all that
need be planned.
The forces of choice for such a mission will be the type of
forces that the coalition successfully used in Operation DESERT
STORM. The initial period of war will offer Russia the opportuni-
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ty to contain the crisis without having to mobilize its full
military potential. The role of the navy and air forces in cer-
tain theaters of strategic military operations, therefore, will
increase relative to that of the Russian ground forces. If the
mobile standing forces are unable to contain the conflict, then
reserve components of the armed forces will be mobilized in order
to complete the defense of the homeland.
Since the U.S. would have to transport equipment and sup-
plies by sea to any overseas contingency response, Russia will
not program its response to allow a "free ride" to the theater of
the crisis as Saddam Hussein permitted coalition forces in the
Persian Gulf war. The size of this force need not be exception-
ally large, and naval forces will allow the Russians the option
of interdiction of the sea-lines of communications during a local
and short war.
The concept of having mobile air and naval forces respond
first to a military threat and larger ground forces only later is
evidence of a considerable shift in thinking in the Russian
military. Such military operational art is the norm in naval
warfare where surface fleets will probably not engage until after
the initial actions by air and subsurface forces.
The shift to a real defensive doctrine should lead the Rus-
sian military to study naval warfare in order to consider the
similarities between war at sea and maneuver warfare ashore.
Indeed, the final USSR issue of Military Thought analysis on the
Persian Gulf war included a discussion of the need to "establish
defensive force groupings within limits of one's own territory in
short time periods." There is a considerable similarity in the
formation of naval task groups which establish a working "sea
control" over certain areas of the oceans for limited periods of
time
.
Perhaps the most significant lesson of the Soviet and Rus-
sian views on the Persian Gulf war is to once again remind us
that their open- source discussions must be seen in the context of
the larger debates that are ongoing. The navy has not been the
most important Soviet armed service and should have not provided
the primary evidence of Soviet military intentions. If the navy-
becomes more important under Russia, however, we will need to
revisit that assumption and perhaps pay less attention to the
ground forces marshals and generals who have dominated Soviet
military thinking during the past decades.
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